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ABSTRACT

This study seeks to understand how global discourses of sea level rise
(SLR) and mangrove ecology influence national climate change adaptation policy
to reduce coastal vulnerability in Suriname. A majority of the Surinamese
population lives along the low elevation coastal zone and is highly exposed to
projected SLR. Failure by the international community to reach agreement on
climate change mitigation means that vulnerable coastal communities must adapt.
The Suriname coast is predominantly shaped by mudbanks and mangroves which
together provide protection against coastal erosion and trap sediments resulting in
coastal accretion. Knowledge claims of mangrove ecology and utility in SLR
adaptation are contested between scientists, policy makers and community activist
groups. Scientific understandings of coastal processes, specifically the
relationship between mangroves and mudbanks and resulting erosion, remain
inconclusive. Local knowledge has offered alternative explanations for this
relationship, but it also has limitations, particularly for large-scale ecological
processes. This study argues that global discourses of SLR and mangrove ecology
need to be countered for sustainable adaptation to ALR. Equitable adaptation
should include local knowledge and understanding of coastal processes while also
drawing on scientific methods of data analysis at large scales.

ix

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Ever since international negotiations to limit the impacts of climate change started
at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de
Janeiro in 1992, countries have not been able to reach a globally binding agreement to
stabilize greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere (Pelling, 2011). One of the best
attempts so far has been the creation of the Kyoto Protocol, an environmental treaty
designed to have countries reduce emissions relative to a base year (usually 1990). This
protocol was unfortunately never ratified by the United States which is the highest
emitter of GHGs per capita, and the protocol is not required to be ratified by China as a
non-Annex-I1 country, even though China surpassed the United States in 2007 to become
the largest emitter of GHGs in the world (www.guardian.co.uk, last accessed March 18,
2012). With this in mind, adaptation to the impacts of climate change is becoming an
accepted reality and is no longer viewed as a choice (Adger et al. 2007, Adger et al. 2009,
Berrang et al. 2010). This generation is now referred to as the Age of Adaptation (Pelling,
2011).

1

The UNFCCC considers Annex-I countries as those that were members of OECD
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries
considered part of the EIT Parties (Economies in Transition).
1

Normative approaches to adaptation decision making are clear: the process should
address power, responsibility and accountability (Bellesteros et al., 2010). However,
these conditions do not translate to contexts where social structures of class and status
ensure protection of assets belonging to elite members of society. Where inclusion and
participation should increase the possibility of diverse knowledge contributions to the
adaptation making process, the reality is often that knowledge and power are intertwined
and the knowledge that enables minimal losses and maximum gains for powerful
members of society is favored. Differences in the determination of adaptation outcomes
as well as the ability to adapt do not only exist between different social groups within
countries but also exist internationally between countries (Smit et al 2000).
Approaches to adaptation are complex, and research on climate change adaptation
is steadily increasing (see Figure 1.1), presumably leading to better understandings of
normative adaptation options. There is a gap, however, between peer-reviewed research
outcomes and the way these outcomes are understood and adopted in developing
countries like Suriname. For example, the First National Communication to the UNFCCC
from the Government of Suriname (GOS) has only one page dedicated to socio-economic
vulnerability (FNC 2005) when literature on this topic is well advanced. This is, of
course, not only a local phenomenon as implied by Head’s (2007) question “[h]asn’t the
IPCC read Latour?” (p. 837), the implication being that social issues of power are also
ignored in international documents. Indeed, climate change adaptation is not simply a
matter of technological innovation but has strong social considerations (Mearns and
Norton 2010). The challenge that remains is of ensuring that new understandings of the
process of adaptation can take root in places that are vulnerable.

2

Figure 1.1. Number of articles listed on Web of Science with the search words “climate
change adaptation” (accessed December 2011).

Research Questions

This research is an analysis of how normative approaches to climate adaptation
are reflected in current actions of the government of Suriname. Drawing on the
transdisciplinary field of political ecology, it seeks to connect histories of colonial and
postcolonial development, ongoing policy-making processes, and contested knowledge
claims to understand how these influence climate change adaptation decision making.
Following Forsyth’s (2011) call for “situated environmental science,” this research
analyzes how existing coastal environmental crises are historically situated and how
sustainable and equitable adaptation can be achieved that is based on local and scientific
knowledges. The importance of a situated approach is explained by Forsyth as follows:
“too much environmental explanation is based on universalistic science derived from
positivist epistemology. Positivistic statements are often inappropriate when applied
across diverse ecological and social contexts because they frame environmental problems
3

in selective ways, are frequently inaccurate, and encourage land-use policies that restrict
local livelihoods in unnecessary ways” (p.44). Nadasdy (2011) further explains that
“[t]he application of environmental knowledge, as a social – and deeply political –
activity, simply cannot be distinguished from the social activity that constitutes its
production and circulation” (p. 130). This study thus seeks to question dominant
narratives in terms of their applicability to the Suriname context and begin the task of
constructing counter narratives that support community rights and decision making
power.

This study is organized around four main research questions:

1. How are coastal processes and crises, such as coastal erosion, turned into dominant
discourses of climate change impacts, and how do these discourses determine
adaptation policies?
Climate change discourses in Suriname center around questions of sea level rise,
mangrove destruction and coastal erosion. Discourse analysis can show us who maintains
power to control decision making outcomes. It gives an insight into the ways that
community representatives and government officials think about finding solutions to
environmental problems. More importantly, local people who are falsely identified as
being the source of the environmental problem tend to be adversely affected by the laws
and rules created to protect the environment, especially when they have no political voice
or access to make their knowledge count. The power of and problem with discourse is
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that the “victims” may themselves start believing the dominant discourse and sacrifice
access to resources in order to alleviate any further harm to the environment.

2. What are the historical development trajectories that have created coastal
geographies and how do they continue to impact adaptation outcomes?
Environmental crises are never ahistorical and an understanding of development,
or better said the active underdevelopment of Suriname by different colonial powers, is
necessary for untangling the complexities of current crises. The challenge of this exercise
is to unpack the cascading series of historical events that led to current conditions in
order to provide a situated counter narrative to currently prevalent dominant discourses.

3. Where and how are knowledge and power currently situated, and how do affected
communities participate in policy making processes?
This question is important to understand current governance processes,
particularly as they are expressed in coastal management laws. Almost 100% of
Suriname coastline legally falls under the semi-protected status of Multi-Use
Management Areas (MUMAs). This means that people who live in these areas are legally
restricted in their activities, and it also means that the government is supposed to actively
manage the land and sea near the coast. This relationship has created certain expectations
from the state by coastal communities. An analysis of current management strategies and
community perceptions gives insight into where and how power is situated. Local
expectations and perceptions may be ill-informed and should be evaluated if coastal
communities are to be in control of the future in light of climate impacts. This research
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question is addressed through qualitative research conducted in the communities of
Totness (Coronie district) and Weg Nar Zee (Wanica district).

4. How are current solutions for coastal environmental problems decided, and what can
be learned from the process so that future adaptation outcomes can be improved and
maladaptations avoided?
The temporal focus of many climate impacts, especially sea level rise, are decades
away but countries are already taking actions to address these. The process by which
decisions are made, whose knowledge counts, who gets to actively participate, and who
gains most by the outcome is a central theme of this dissertation. Several seawalls, dams
and dykes have been constructed in Suriname over the years as engineering solutions are
favored for environmental problems. One in particular, the seawall in Totness, Coronie
district, gives much insight into critical issues of power and knowledge and can provide
insight into how the process may be improved when future decisions are made for other
adaptations.

The next chapter presents the literature that was reviewed, outlines methods used,
and provides details about the study sites. The remainder of the dissertation is divided
into two review chapters and two case study chapters. The review chapters focus on
discourses (chapter 3) and local histories (chapter 4) while the case studies focus on
coastal management at Weg Naar Zee (chapter 5) and the politics of the seawall
construction at Totness (chapter 6). In chapter 3, discourses on sea level rise and the role
of mangroves in shoreline protection are global and locally interpreted. Meanwhile, the

6

narrative of local mangrove destruction fits the pattern of global mangrove loss. Chapter
4 investigates how a location like Totness in Coronie slowly became more connected
with global markets and globally-driven development strategies and through this process
actually lost their independence and self-reliance. Chapter 5 asks what the roles are of
local communities, national governments and international perspectives in climate change
adaptation. Local perceptions are thus connected to national and international actors. This
chapter also concerns the importance, and limitations, of local and scientific knowledge
with respect to ecological scale. While chapter 4 has a historical perspective, chapter 6
focuses on current events. Both are important for understanding how future adaptations
may be developed. Chapter 6 is an in-depth analysis of the politics of the ongoing seawall
in Coronie. Here, the local became a ‘battleground’ for national votes and international
politics between Suriname and its former colonizer, The Netherlands. Finally, chapter 7
offers concluding remarks.

7

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODS

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the notion of adaptation by critically
analyzing debates on adaptation norms, resilience and vulnerability. It then outlines
changing approaches to political ecology, especially the shift from structural to
poststructual theories and methods. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the
methodological component of this research, detailing the range of qualitative methods
that were utilized for data collection and analysis, and the choice of research sites. The
chapter ends with an extended reflection on positionality and its possible ramifications
for this research.

Climate Change Adaptation

As the literature on climate change adaptation has increased (Janssen, 2007), so
has the number of definitions of the term2. One of the more commonly accepted
definitions was proposed by the IPCC (2001) and states that “adaptation is an adjustment

2

Schipper (2007) alone identified 10 different definitions for adaptation.
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in ecological, social or economic systems in response to observed or expected changes in
climate stimuli and their effects and impacts in order to alleviate adverse impacts of
change or take advantage of new opportunities” (p. 982). In the latest Special Report
from the IPCC which focuses on the disaster risk and adaptation (IPCC 2012), the
authors make a distinction between social and ecological adaptation and the definition
reads “[i]n human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its
effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems,
the process of adjustment to actual climate and its effects; human intervention may
facilitate adjustment to expected climate” (p. 5). The study of human adaptation has a
long history in the social sciences, especially in anthropology (Janssen and Ostrom, 2006)
concerning the concept of cultural adaptation (Hardesty 1986). Among geographers,
especially those studying natural hazards, there has been an emphasis on coping tactics
and strategies (Perramond, 2007) which are closely related to adaptation strategies.
Currently, adaptation is almost entirely discussed in response to climate change impacts.
One of the first detailed analyses of the different types of climate change
adaptation was done by Smit et al. (2000). Early on, the distinction was made that
adaptation may refer to natural or socio-economic systems. For socio-economic systems,
they pointed to several other characteristics: it can be classified based on its purpose,
mode of implementation, or the institutional form it takes; it can be technological,
economic or legal; it can be reactive or anticipatory depending on the timing; it can be
autonomous or planned; and it can take place at different scales, from the household to
the state. The distinction between reactive and anticipatory adaptation has been called
into question (Pelling, 2011) because most types of adaptations will probably be
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continuous, meaning that one climatic event may trigger the response to adapt which will
most likely be a learning process for continuous adaptation. In that sense, adaptation is
both reactive to one particular event that signals a new extreme in climatic conditions as
well as anticipatory for similar future events of equal or greater magnitude.
There is also a well-known classification difference between mitigation and
adaptation. The early IPCC reports (1990, 1996) only referred to mitigation of climate
change but the latest report (2007) featured adaptation much more prominently. This is a
testament to the realization that it is perhaps too late to mitigate climate change without
the need for adaptation. The point here, however, is that since mitigation requires a
change or adjustment in behavior (i.e. reducing CO2 emissions) in order to alleviate the
impacts of climate change, it is in fact a type of adaptation. The main difference is that
responsibilities and challenges of mitigation and adaptation are situated with different
actors so that it may be easier to implement new policies by keeping this artificial
distinction. Mitigation is primarily the responsibility of rich countries with industrialized
economies that emit GHGs. Adaptation, on the other hand, will be most challenging for
poor countries that are expected to be impacted most while they have the least adaptive
capacity. Mitigation is still a form of adaptation that requires only one action: reduced
emission of greenhouse gases (GHG), primarily CO2, and other, sometimes more potent,
GHG (known collectively as CO2e). Adaptation, however, may refer to a multitude of
strategies adopted by poor countries. The artificial separation of rich and poor countries is
also problematic because poor people in rich countries often face similar risks as poor
people in poor countries. Elites in poor countries will be able to adapt with the same ease
as elites in rich countries.

10

One of the more recent classifications in the adaptation literature focuses on
livelihood risk management and offers the following categories: mobility, storage,
diversification, communal pooling, and market exchange (Agrawal, 2010). He further
analyzed 118 cases of actual adaptation worldwide from the UNFCCC Coping Strategies
Database and found that diversification and communal pooling were the most common
strategies in the study sample. This is an interesting departure from the usual approach to
understanding adaptation and is quite useful. Agrawal also analyzed the role of
institutions as they relate to these coping strategies because “[a]ll efforts to adapt depend
for their success on specific institutional arrangements because adaptation never occurs in
an institutional vacuum” (p. 178). Two important lessons to take from this analysis are
that adaptation is already taking place so that the literature does not need to continue
theorizing adaptation from an empirical vacuum. Also, the importance of institutional
arrangements rather than technological innovations is gaining attention. If governance
can change in order to allow local people greater participation in decision making and to
allow more room and recognition of local knowledge, then these issues need to be
addressed at all levels of government.

Normative Adaptation. Adaptation literature includes several claims for
normative adaptation with different focal points. Klein et al. (2005) propose that
adaptation should focus on increasing the resilience of ‘vulnerable natural systems’ while
improving public awareness. Other debates on ‘fairness in adaptation’ (Adger et al. 2006)
and studies of normative adaptation policy (Urwin and Jordan, 2008; Schipper, 2007) are
valid but lack critical review of social and political struggles in the very places where
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adaptation needs to take place. Klein et al. (2005), for example, have identified five
approaches to planned anticipatory adaptation:
1. Increasing the ability of physical infrastructures to withstand the impacts of
climate change
2. Increasing the flexibility of potentially vulnerable systems that are managed by
humans
3. Enhancing the adaptability of vulnerable natural systems
4. Reversing trends that increase vulnerability
5. Improving public awareness and preparedness

Little attention is being paid in these criteria to how social constructs of power
and race, for example, influence adaptation outcomes. One notable exception is a
discussion by Adger et al. (2005) who presented a set of criteria to evaluate successful
anticipatory adaptation: it must be effective, efficient, equitable, and legitimate. The
authors recognize that in any adaptation measure there will be winners and losers, and
who gets to decide is often related to existing power structures. Adaptation, they say,
must therefore be “legitimate”. They explain that “…the rules by which decisions are
being made and the underlying distributions of power influence the legitimacy of the
decisions. Legitimacy is the extent to which decisions are acceptable to participants and
non-participants that are affected by those decisions” (Adger et al. 2005, p. 83). This
study thus seeks to expose issues of power and politics as they relate to knowledge
production and local implementation of adaptation. The paper unfortunately does not
have case studies with examples for how to achieve these goals. Speaking from a
normative stance is important. For political ecologists it is often the only position to take,
but adaptation is going on right now in places with very uneven power structures. This is
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the departure point for political ecologists who wish to engage policy makers and
influence politics.

Resilience and Adaptation. The theoretical approach to climate change
adaptation from a systems perspective is increasingly growing (Pelling, 2011). Holling
(1973) was one of the first (ecologists) to introduce ‘resilience’ in the natural sciences
and it remains one of the main concepts in systems thinking. Resilience is defined as the
ability of a system to resist change or bounce back from an external shock or
perturbation. Applied to natural systems, resilience implies that systems have a stable
equilibrium state and the system’s resilience can, for example, be measured in terms of
speed of recovery, i.e. when critical species resume performing ecosystem functions. It is
also referred to as the ‘elasticity’ of a system. Systems can be pushed over the limit, a
tipping point or threshold, so that they enter an alternate stable equilibrium whereby the
system cannot easily switch back to its previous state as a result of the resilience of the
new state. One example of this is the multiple stable states of lakes that go from being
clear to eutrophic after a critical limit or tipping point of nutrient load has been crossed
(Scheffer, 2009). One of the problems with resilience as a system property is that it is
often perceived as being only positive (Klein et al. 2003), but as the example above
explains, eutrophic lakes are undesirable for many reasons (i.e. anoxic conditions which
decrease productivity of desirable species such as fish).The resilience framework became
the foundation for a group of natural and social scientists who formed the Resilience
Alliance. Its members practice science in a wide range of disciplines and have been
applying systems theory to social systems as well. Their analytical framework implies
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that social and natural systems are not separate but closely connected, similar to
geographers who have studied hybrid relationships of the natural and social (see for
example Haraway, 1991; Whatmore, 2002). The resilience alliance approach also implies
that coupled human and natural systems (CHANS), also called social-ecological systems
(SES), can reach tipping points that would transform stable and productive communities
that make sustainable use of their natural resources, to ones where natural resources are
stressed and assets are lost as a result of climate impacts (Walker 2006). The main
problem with this framework from a human geography perspective is the idea that social
“systems” behave in some predictable way (after a disturbance) so that they can be
modeled in a way that is similar to the modeling of an ecosystem response to a
disturbance (i.e. coral bleaching after persistent high sea surface temperatures during an
El Nino season). The positivist epistemology in systems theory is thus not well-suited to
incorporate power asymmetries in society that are frequently based on social constructs
(Pelling 2011). Moreover, like the eutrophic lake example above, many social systems
(communities and countries) are places with poverty, inequality, corruption, and other
social problems. These are not the places that we want ideally to be resilient and in a
stable equilibrium. Klein et al. (2003) posed this dilemma when they considered coastal
megacities that are vulnerable to climate change. Resilience is only desirable then when
dealing with social and natural systems that are functioning and sustainable, but should
not be the main goal in communities, cities or countries that are dysfunctional,
unsustainable and lacking equitable institutions.
Systems ecologists also started applying concepts of adaptation decades ago in
their adaptive management approach to natural resources (Holling 1978). This concept is
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still very important in climate change adaptation today. Adaptive management considers
experimentation, monitoring and learning in an adaptive cycle in resource management.
It led to important breakthrough concepts of non-linearity which allowed resource
managers to abandon the idea that ecosystems had to be maintained in some desirable
equilibrium. Many farms today, which are considered artificial ecosystems (interaction of
vegetation, soils, climate, insects, etc.), still strive to maintain an optimal equilibrium
state which is increasingly energy intensive and ultimately unsustainable.

Vulnerability and Adaptation. Planned adaptation is usually implemented after
a vulnerability assessment has been conducted. The climate change vulnerability
literature presents vulnerability as a function of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive
capacity. A community’s vulnerability should become apparent after these variables have
been assessed so that adaptation options can be reviewed and implemented. The accepted
framework assumes that exposure and sensitivity together are an indication of how a
community or region will be impacted while adaptive capacity generally points to a
community’s (or ecosystem’s) ability to adapt. Exposure and sensitivity tend to focus on
spatial characteristics while adaptive capacity usually addresses socio-economic issues.
Moreover, exposure and sensitivity tend to focus on future conditions while adaptive
capacity looks at the current financial, technological, institutional, and other capacities
needed to adapt.
There are several weaknesses in assessing vulnerability. First, many future
vulnerabilities remain unknown. The emphasis in most assessments is change in
temperature and SLR as these are easiest to evaluate using different scenarios of
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atmospheric CO2 concentrations (van Aalst et al., 2008), but we know very little, for
example, of changing precipitation patterns or potential disease outbreaks. Second,
empirical evidence of the existence of tipping points in natural systems is growing but is
still in its infancy (Schepper, 2009). Given the many positive and negative feedback
loops in natural systems, it is highly unlikely that the relationship between climate
impacts and sensitivity will be linear which makes it difficult to assess vulnerability.
Third, vulnerability and adaptation are based on future atmospheric CO2 concentrations
which are a moving target because it is not possible to predict how or when major
emitters, the United States and China, will respond. Canada, for example, recently
announced its departure from the Kyoto Protocol because it does not want to be fined for
developing new energy sources that will potentially add significant amounts of GHGs to
the atmosphere (www.bbc.co.uk, last accessed March 18, 2012).

Political Ecology

This research uses a political ecology lens to understand the intersection of global
environmental change (GEC) and climate change adaptation. One definition of PE that
maintains its universality is as “a concern with tracing the genealogy of narratives
concerning ‘the environment’, with identifying power relationships supported by such
narratives, and with asserting the consequences of hegemony over, and within, these
narratives for economic and social development, and particularly for constraining
possibilities for self-determination” (Stott and Sullivan, 2000, p.2). In the context of
climate change induced SLR in Suriname, the “genealogy of narratives” concerns coastal
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mangroves and mudbanks, how coastal communities in Suriname relate to these dynamic
systems, and how government policies interact with all three: mangroves, mudbanks and
communities. Similarly, constraints on “possibilities for self-determination” relate to the
(in)ability of vulnerable communities to participate in adaptation decision-making. This
research moreover addresses the apparent lack of ecology (Walker, 2005) as well as lack
of critical engagement with policy-making (Walker, 2006) in much recent PE work by
doing an analysis of local and scientific understandings of coastal geomorphologic
processes that are responsible for coastal erosion and accretion. This research also seeks
to understand how these knowledges are used in determining actual adaptation
technological and policy responses in Suriname. In addition, this research provides an
opportunity to address the sub-discipline’s apparent lack of politics (Walker, 2007), or
the (perceived) lack of interest of many political ecologists to “make a difference” and be
active outside academia. Indeed, it is only an opportunity because the research must first
be completed and a degree must be obtained before avenues can be explored to use the
results for active engagement with policy makers and local activists.
While primary literature remains the main source for adaptation literature, much
of the theoretical debate concerning adaptation can also be found in publications from
international organizations such as development and conservation Non-Government
Organizations (NGOs). This could be a response to the often inaccessible nature of
scientific publications for developing country resource managers and policy makers
because of their high cost whereas grey literature is usually freely available from
organizations’ Internet pages.
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The ‘ecology’ in political ecology historically originated in the form of
environmental crises in developing countries. Blaikie’s work on The Political Economy
of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries (1985) is widely recognized as the first political
ecology study that emphasized the politics of environmental crises. Research on hazards,
which had been around for decades already, turned out to be ineffective in explaining
why increasingly more people were dying from natural hazards. Critics argued that the
choices which made people more vulnerable were structured for them, rather than that
people had unlimited opportunities but chose to make illogical decisions. This resonated
with Marxist geographers who had started using a structural approach to explaining
unequal power relations. In terms of soil erosion then, political ecologists were asking
which structures, political and economic, led marginalized people to make certain choices
(that were in effect prescribed for them) that often worsened their vulnerability and
increasingly limited future options. Much of this analysis initially took place in less
developed countries focusing on poor, rural land-users and was labeled Third World
Political Ecology (TWPE) (Bryant and Bailey 1997). Political ecology thus became
defined as a “concern for ecology combined with a broadly defined political economy”
(Blaikie and Brookfield 1987, p. 17). Unlike hazards researchers’ focus on the effects of
extreme geophysical events, TWPE was more concerned with chronic environmental
crises, and unlike Marxist geographers’ interest in structures at a higher societal scale,
TWPE also emphasized the local scale in their analysis.

Poststructural Turn. Political ecology took poststructural and feminist turns in
the 1990s. Poststructural political ecology sought to move away from a ‘fixation’ on class
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struggle in political ecology. The foundations for a poststructural analysis were laid by
Foucault (1980), who argued that rather than language mirroring reality, language was
instrumental in the construction of reality. It follows then that those actors with power are
also those who control the production of hegemonic discourses. As Escobar (1996)
explained “there cannot be a materialist analysis which is not, at the same time, a
discursive analysis.” Moreover, “[d]iscourse …is the articulation of knowledge and
power, of statements and visibilities, of the visible and expressible. Discourse is the
process through which social reality inevitably comes into being” (p. 46). The role of
language is therefore of central importance in the analysis of unequal power relations and
the strategies employed to manage them.
Poststructural political ecology thus involves an analysis of the way that power,
language and knowledge production interact with one another as they produce social and
environmental outcomes. This point is of critical importance in the analysis of climate
change adaptation. Climate scientists and government planners currently are fixated on
the UNFCCC process which will determine global responses to climate change. This
framework was set up specifically to deal with technological and political obstacles,
however, and unequal power relations among nations are a constant underlying current
but never openly discussed. Countries currently form alliances to correct some of the
power inequalities but this has not resulted in much progress. The framework itself has a
built-in mechanism to give equal voice to all countries by requiring consensus for
acceptance of new decisions, but this has also proven ineffective. For example, the
framework adopted the Cancun agreement in 2010 despite the opposition of Bolivia.
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As a result of the diversification of political ecology scholarship, the field is
experiencing somewhat of an identity crisis. This sentiment is expressed by Watts (2000:
592, quoted by Walker, 2005) that “[p]olitical ecology has in a sense almost dissolved
itself … as scholars have sought to extend its reach.” Even some older criticisms of
political ecology research are re-entering the debate. For example, Vayda and Walter
(1999) argued that political ecology had become ‘politics without ecology’. In order to
provide an overview of political ecology, especially to young scholars who are eager to
make an investment in this field, Walker (2005, 2006, 2007) published a series of papers
that clarify the current positions of political ecology with respect to its involvement with
ecology, policy and politics. He claims that ecology (the study of biophysical processes)
is still very much part of some important political ecology research but that the
poststructural turn has indeed resulted in a lack of purely ecological analysis which may
hurt the field in its quest to become relevant. Further, he claims that policy related work
(or doing ‘useful’ research) is unfortunately not on the minds of many political ecologists
in the academic world (the field is still largely focused inward) and that there is room for
critical and engaged research that emphasizes ethical questions of a political nature.
These concerns are addressed in the chapters that follow.

Research Methods

My research topic was born out of multiple conversations I had with academics at
the University of Suriname and government officials from the Planning Office in
Suriname in the Summer of 2007. Before departing to Suriname, I was primarily
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interested in climate impacts on coastal cities and how social and planning processes in
such cities influence adaptation policies. The preliminary interviews led me to focus
more on coastal management and climate change, specifically Integrated Coastal Zone
Management (ICZM) which is specifically mentioned by the IPCC (2007) as a possible
adaptation solution for low lying coastal areas that will be impacted by sea level rise
(SLR). The research focus later took a more poststructural emphasis as it morphed into an
analysis of discourse and knowledge claims that are used in making ICZM and general
adaptation policies. A more detailed overview of the different research methods that I
employed follows below.

Semi-Structured Interviews. I used semi-structured interviews (see Appendix B
for a list of questions) and archival research to collect data for the analysis of discourses,
social contract and environmental histories. Interviews are often used as an alternative to
questionnaires because they allow the participant to explain his or her experiences in
more detail. They are usually unstructured or semi-structured which means that the
interview is fluid so that the interviewer is free to take the interview in unanticipated
directions. This is one of the many strengths of interviews because the researcher often
does not know the full extent of experiences that she is trying to capture. Another is that
interviews allow participants to construct their own accounts of their experiences rather
than select from a limited set of options. When selecting interviewees, the goal is not to
choose a representative sample as in questionnaires but to select an ‘illustrative’ one. This
means that one has to put some thought into selecting a participant who is well-suited for
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the specific research topic. Some specific techniques that should be used in finding the
right participant include snowballing or introductions by ‘gatekeepers.’

Archival Research. There is a general lack of scientific peer-reviewed
publications on environmental issues in Suriname which required me to rely much on
consultant reports written by different government ministries and other non-government
organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank. Capacity within many
government institutions is frequently limited and most of these reports have been written
by local consultants who operate in the private sector as consultants but frequently
maintain regular employment with the university or elsewhere. There is much overlap
among the authors of the different reports as the pool of consultants in Suriname is small
and the few who do this work win, or are requested to complete, most of the available
contracts. This is especially true for studies on coastal zone issues and climate change
impacts. Despite these obvious shortcomings, these studies provide important insights
into governance issues and past recommendations for improvement in governance.
I thus relied on archives to collect data that could not be gathered from interviews.
As I explain in chapter five, one of the main avenues for expressing concern about
environmental degradation, lack of transparency or poor governance is through the
media. The two main newspapers, De Ware Tijd and De West, are well-known and
widely distributed morning and evening newspapers of which the former has the biggest
readership. Press freedom in Suriname is perceived to be good although a recent high
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grade from Reporters Without Borders was retracted after complaints from local
journalists.3

Discourse Analysis. Discourse analysis has become a commonly accepted notion
in geographic research and is a pillar in political ecology research. Discourse analysis is
preoccupied with the process through which hegemonic ideas, not just participants’ life
experiences, become dominant in society. It is a method that exemplifies
poststructuralism, a movement in which the constitutive role of language is (re-)
examined (Escobar, 1996). It has led researchers not only to conclude that concepts like
‘biodiversity’ and ‘sustainable development’ are part of a hegemonic discourse that carry
much political baggage, but that even more commonly used terms like ‘nature’ and
‘culture’ are socially constructed too. Foucault brought to our attention the way in which
“’reality’ is never transparent to us but accessible only in particular ways” (Braun and
Wainwright, 2001: 46). Foucault’s (1980) studies on the historical emergence of
commonly accepted concepts such as madness, sexuality, and the body showed how
discourse and its discursive practices by powerful actors with political agendas shape
these concepts so that there is nothing intrinsically ‘common’ about them. Foucault
exposed the cyclical nature of knowledge production through power and, in turn, how
power operates through knowledge.
My interest in discourse analysis is primarily with regard to climate change
impacts, how coastal ecosystems and processes are viewed differently by different actors,
3

Reporters Without Borders published a survey on press freedom in 2011 ranking
Suriname at number 22 out of 179 countries. After protests from the main journalist
organization in Suriname, the survey authors acknowledges that more information is
necessary to make these results more representative.
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and which actors ensure that one dominant discourse emerges. I am also interested in the
ways that powerful international organizations are developing new language on climate
change and how this filters down to the national and local levels and how these languages
are co-opted and reshaped by powerful elite to support their political agendas. Making
discourse analysis operational as a method therefore requires an exploration and
examination of a trail of discursive evidence across different scales. This evidence can be
found in archives such as official government documents, newspaper articles, billboards
or other texts and visuals.

Development Histories. I used development histories to gain an understanding of
(i) how development projects have altered the physical environment and thus determine
adaptation possibilities, (ii) the importance of local knowledge in finding adaptation
solutions and (iii) possible linkages between ecological scale and limits to local
knowledge. Histories of specific locations are important for understanding how people
have responded to development projects and environmental changes in the past and can
therefore inform how people may respond to such changes in the future. They provide a
better understanding of social contracts between local communities and the state as these
contracts create the space within which communities are allowed to operate. I have also
used environmental histories to tease out the complexity of ecological scale as it relates to
local knowledge and how scale relates to possible limits to local knowledge.
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Research Sites

Totness in the district of Coronie and Weg Naar Zee (WNZ) in the district of
Paramaribo (Figure 2.1) were selected for this research because both places are currently
experiencing coastal erosion and have particular development paths that have contributed
to this crisis. Ongoing community actions and state interventions give insight into
potential future adaptation to SLR. While explanations for ongoing erosion at both
locations are still being debated, 'climate change' and 'sea level rise' are frequently evoked
as primary causes. The GOS has taken several steps to stop the erosion and flooding. It
completed an Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) project, which is recognized
by the IPCC (2007) as an important adaptation strategy for vulnerable coastlines, and
WNZ was included as a pilot site (IaDB website, www.iadb.org, last accessed February
26, 2012). The government has furthermore started construction of a USD70 million

Figure 2.1. Location of study sites.
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12km-long seawall in Coronie near Totness and it completed construction of a 1
kilometer earthen dam enforced with logs and tarp at WNZ (see Figure 2.2). The
knowledges that were used to decide on these specific interventions and the decision
making process were also invaluable for this research.
The research was conducted between 2009 and 2011 in three locations: the city of
Paramaribo, the community at Weg Naar Zee (WNZ, literally meaning "Road to the
Sea") which is located in the district Paramaribo, and the community of Totness in
Coronie district. Paramaribo, the capital city, is located in the identically named district
and together with district Wanica makes up the greater urban area where 67% of the total

Figure 2.2. Sea defense at Weg Naar Zee (photo: R. Nijbroek)
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population lives (ABS 2009). WNZ is a resort, the smallest political unit, where residents
report coastal erosion at a rate of 50 meters per year and salinization of well water.
Farmers at WNZ predominantly raise livestock and produce cash crops such as
vegetables and flowers. The local road network has historically been constructed on sand
and shell ridges that run parallel to the coastline about 1km apart. The population of
WNZ is mainly of Indian and Indonesian descent.
I conducted 20 semi-structured interviews among the 67 households at WNZ who
live on the two roads located closest to the shoreline: Oedaraysingh Varmaweg and
Brantimakaweg (WNZ here after refers to this location and not the entire resort). I
continued selecting interviewees and constantly transcribed and analyzed the transcripts
so that I could determine when answers were becoming repetitive in order to know when
to stop. The interviewees were selected at first by snowballing and later by seeking direct
contact. The spokesperson of a local farmers’ organization posted an article in the local
newspaper after a high water event flooded many farm fields shortly after my arrival in
Suriname. I had counted on a contact at the University of Suriname to introduce me to
this person, but the newspaper article allowed me to go directly to him and explain my
research interest and whether he was willing to talk. After the initial meeting, I made an
appointment with him for a more formal interview, and after this was completed I asked
him if he could recommend any other farmers in WNZ that I could interview. This led to
several other people who were all eager to discuss the problem of coastal erosion, land
use change, climate change and adaptation. When I could no longer meet people through
snowballing, I would drive through the neighborhood in late afternoons when people had
stopped working in their fields and would usually relax on the balcony or be busy in the
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yard doing other activities. I would approach them and explain my research interest
which always resulted in an appointment for another day when they were willing to meet
with me.
I also conducted seven semi-structured interviews with key informants from
Totness or closely involved with the seawall project in Totness (see Appendix A for a
summary of all data sources.). Here, I decided to work with key informants instead of
household members because several projects in recent years that focused on erosion and
water management had divided the community and become sensitive issues. I therefore
sought out interviewees who could reasonably be expected to give an overview of
perspectives of certain social groups. This group included a large scale rice farmer (one
of a small group remaining after years of setbacks in this sector), a representative of a
national women’s organization, a local high-ranking government official, a local activist
whose organization opposes the seawall construction, an engineer with in-depth
knowledge of the seawall construction, and several people with knowledge of how the
stakeholder consultations were done as well as how the seawall was financed. One
shortfall of this research is that I was not able to interview anyone from a key social
group in Coronie: a small community of Javanese farmers. It was explained that this
community grew rice near the coast but when erosion accelerated, they moved to other
land closer to the East-West Connection. A lack of financial resources and limited time
prevented me from being able to interview any members of this group.
In order to gain a better understanding of coastal management and specifically
ICZM, I interviewed nine government officials from different ministries who served on a
committee on coastal management. Additional details of how this group functioned and
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the challenges of inter-ministerial committees are provided in chapter five. Finally, I
interviewed three sluicegate managers, two fish smokers, and six additional experts with
knowledge of environmental problems in Suriname and coastal issues specifically. I
relied much on archival research materials from government ministries, consultant
reports, news sources and tourist brochures to broaden and supplement interview data.
For all the interviews I followed standard Internal Review Board (IRB)
procedures which include reading a brief statement to the interviewees and giving them a
copy to keep. These statements were in both English and Dutch. Some of the key
information that I stressed was that the interviews were anonymous, that I could not give
them any money for their willingness to participate but that I could try to answer any
questions they may have on climate change or the greenhouse effect, and that the results
of my research will likely lead to me obtaining a higher degree at a foreign university and
be published in an academic journal. In general, respondents did not care to keep a copy
of the paper and expressed no concern for maintaining anonymity, probably because the
topic was not sensitive but rather critically important for their livelihoods. Several people,
such as two activists, requested specifically that I use their names. I granted this request
knowing that they were using me as yet another avenue to reach a different audience for
their plight, but also because I was well aware that I was using their willingness to
participate to gather data that would lead to my successful completion of the research.
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Positionality

Working in Suriname, the country where I spent my formative years, was both
very rewarding and extremely difficult. Suriname is a very small country in many ways.
As a popular Surinamese late night show host jokes with his guests when they are
introduced, the first thing that people ask when they meet you is “who is your mother and
who is your father?” It is socially acceptable and part of the culture to place new people
politically and more importantly whether they (or their parents) were part of the military
regime that ruled the country for most of the 1980’s. This is completely understandable
as this period was marked by a constant fear as neighbors started reporting “antigovernment behavior” to the military junta, and it was not uncommon for people,
especially prominent politicians, journalists and university professors, to be picked up for
questioning. Members of society who opposed the military government operated in
underground networks to pass information, secret newsletters, and more.
When I talked to interviewees who were openly sympathetic to the ex-military
government, I tried as much as possible to avoid the subject of politics. This was difficult
given that elections were held in the midst of my research and this was first and foremost
on everybody’s mind. Avoiding the topic of politics was especially challenging because
it was expected that the military leader from the 1980s, Mr. Bouterse, would win the
presidential elections. In one case, the interviewee pressed me on my opinion, and I
explained that I was a young child during the 1980’s and experienced the period very
differently from the way that adults would have, and that both my parents were not
sympathizers of the military regime but that neither was politically active in a party or
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otherwise. This did not pose a problem for the interview, and we continued to have an
informative discussion.
One issue that became a problem in the WNZ farming community was that it was
very difficult to interview women. I had several opportunities to interview farmers with
their wives and encouraged the wives to participate in the conversation. This was usually
met with claims that they did not know as much as their husbands. My explanation that I
was interested in everyone’s opinion and that people had different ways of seeing the
same event, in essence different ways of seeing the world, did not lead to increased
participation. I was worried that these women were reluctant to participate because their
husbands may not have approved that they talk to an unknown man or that their
knowledge would somehow contradict the husband’s which may cause friction. This
concern of mine was not verified in any way.
Reluctance to participate in discussions of climate change and landuse change
seemed to be more related to a perception that people may not know as much as someone
who had studied at a university. At times, people expressed concern for embarrassment
that they would say something that did not make sense. This made me more aware that I
had to set up the interview in such a way that the respondent had deep knowledge of the
local history and farming ways that cannot necessarily be obtained with a university
degree. Another effective method was to first talk about what types of crops were
common, how the rainy season had been, and other questions that could be answered
clearly and confidently.
The common but false perception that the social sciences are somehow less
rigorous than the so-called “hard” sciences, or that only technological innovation can
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solve climate change problems, exists in Suriname among all members of society. Being
trained as an engineer, I understand this bias very well. I was able to use my background
in engineering as an advantage to gain people’s trust however. Especially with farming
communities, I had good conversation with some farmers on different soil compositions
and soil water holding capacities and how that changed the spatial variability of yields on
their fields. Among government officials, it was even more important that I explain my
full background and people expressed more interest in my engineering degrees than my
pursuit of a dissertation in social sciences. I avoided getting into any discussions on the
merits of this perception or the rigor of social science but rather stuck to my script.
The issue of race is as complex in Suriname as it is elsewhere. There are many
different ethnic and racial groups in Suriname. While race relations between ethnic
groups are quite good, race is not invisible in society. As a creole, a person of mostly
mixed black and white descent, I was especially conscious of my positionality when
doing interviews with famers at WNZ who were primarily of Indian and Javanese
descent. People did not make observations based on race, however, but were much more
likely to talk about other members in the community that were sympathizers of the
military regime or connected with the current political party. Only one respondent of
African descent made derogatory remarks about people of another ethnicity as he made
claims that the Indian party always wanted control of the Ministry of Public Works (as it
did during my research) so that they could continue granting contracts only to Indian
contractors. The issue of race was not explored in great details in my research, however,
as it became obvious that party politics was a more important theme. This is further
discussed in chapter six.
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As I have eluded several times so far, the relatively recent military regime in the
1980s and the resulting division it created in society is still the most dominant factor that
divides political life. Suriname politics started out with a system of political parties based
on religion or race (these two were often related). But after the military regime staged a
coup on February 25, 1980, power became situated with a group of soldiers who came
from all ethnic backgrounds in society. The national Democratic Party (NDP) was
created by the coup leader, Mr. Bouterse, and continued to represent all different ethnic
groups. Mr. Bouterse himself is of mixed descent although he frequently makes reference
to his native American heritage. In response to the period of military power, the largest
Black (National Party of Suriname - NPS), Indian (Progressive Reform Party – VHP) and
Javanese (Kaum Tani Persatuan Indonesia - KTPI) parties combined forces to defeat Mr.
Bouterse’s party in the late 80’s. The coalition still exists but much has changed since the
Maroon population became politically organized and no longer votes predominantly with
the NPS. Additionally, all parties have had smaller factions split and form new parties
that sometimes follow racial divisions.
Like race, language plays an important part in doing research with diverse
populations. The official language in Suriname is Dutch, but many different ethnic
groups speak different languages. The national creole language is Sranan or
Sranantongo. I am fluent in both languages and was therefore able to switch to whichever
language was more comfortable for the respondent. Where I have used respondents’
statements in the text of my dissertation, I have provided an English translation in order
to make the document flow better and to allow the reader to understand the meaning and
importance of the statement. This, as well as presenting spoken word in written form,
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introduces some distortion from the person’s actual language which unfortunately cannot
be avoided. Where certain words have specific meanings that do not translate easily to
English, I have left the words in the original language.
A final point I wish to make here is how my role in the relatively small
environmental community may have affected my research. This community generally
treats one another with trust and new information is often quickly exchanged. Several
members are independent consultants and many of them usually work together on
different projects, thus helping each other with work. One feature of this group that was
important for my research is what can be considered gossip. I was often passed
information that was not part of a formal data collection process but simply because I was
considered a member of the group, even though it was clear to everyone in the
community that I was working on my dissertation research. This created a dilemma
because the information was often significant for my research but was not always
verifiable. I treated gossip as important data and reported on it in such a way as to protect
the source of the unknowing informant. Whenever possible, I also verified the
information during planned data collection.
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CHAPTER THREE
DISCOURSES OF SEA LEVEL RISE AND MANGROVE DESCTRUCTION

Introduction

Discourse analysis has long been a major part of political ecology. While
discourse analysis is an epistemological exercise, narrative analysis is important for
understanding how knowledge of specific events is communicated. Environmental
narratives are story lines with a beginning and end that tend to “ring true”, and they
include actors who are usually assigned blame or responsibility in the story (Forsyth and
Walker 2008). These narratives are important for policymakers as they will make
arguments for controlling the actions of certain, often unknowing, groups to achieve
desired environmental outcomes. As Forsyth and Walker (2008) explain, the term
narrative “… has been used to describe succinct summaries of environmental cause and
effect that are seen as factual within popular debates or policy networks, but which are
essentially based on highly selective participation in problem definition and knowledge
production” (p. 17). Narratives can serve as powerful means to create dominant
discourses which affect how others understand the unfolding of environmental crises.
When narratives are ill-informed, however, they can also create “false” discourses.
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Among geographers, there is a long history of discourse analysis related to
environmental problems. For example Zimmerer’s work on soil erosion in the Andes
(2004) and Leach and Mearns’ studies in desertification in Africa (1996) are well-known
examples by prominent political ecologists. More recently, Forsyth and Walker (2008)
used discourse analysis to study how human-environment relations are misrepresented by
different stakeholders in the highlands of Thailand. They uncovered multiple
(incomplete) narratives of water management and soil erosion, for example, that have led
to different discourses of the same events: one of highland communities as forest
protectors and the other as forest destroyers. In order to deconstruct these false discourses
it is critical to understand the incomplete narratives that created them in the first place.
Discourse analysis can show us how decision making is influenced and how
communities’ representatives and government officials determine solutions to
environmental problems. More importantly, the decisions that are made often impact
people who are falsely identified as being the source of the problem (see for example
Watts 1983a). When these people have no political voice or access to means to let their
knowledge count, they tend to be adversely affected by the laws and rules created to
protect the environment. The power of and problem with discourse is that the “victims”
may themselves start believing the dominant discourse and sacrifice access to resources
in order to alleviate any further harm to the environment.
As the predicted impacts from climate change are becoming better understood and
the level of accuracy of sea level rise is increasing, people are searching for coping
strategies and adaptation measures. This is happening at the national level as well as
locally in coastal communities. Finding appropriate adaptations requires that any false
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discourses of environmental change are uncovered and corrected. Two important
discursive constructions that impact coastal adaptation in Suriname are related to extent
of sea level rise and mangrove destruction and rehabilitation. These are connected in the
following manner: sea level rise will have disastrous consequences for Suriname in the
near term, and mangrove destruction by coastal residents is worsening the impacts of sea
level rise. I have analyzed the different discourses to expose the contradictions such that
adaptation solutions can be appropriately informed.

Sea Level Rise Discourses

The most commonly referenced and accepted SLR rise predictions are published
in the IPCC assessment reports (IPCC 1990, 1995, 2001, 2007). The reports are written
by teams of scientists from across the globe, and the process is generally perceived as
scientifically rigorous, relying only on peer-reviewed studies1. The fourth assessment
report (AR4) indicates that global mean sea level rise is expected to be in the range of 18
to 59cm in 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999 (IPCC, 2007). These predictions are based
on six different scenarios for future conditions and are further elaborated in the report. An
average SLR of 59 cm is therefore the highest predicted level for the worst scenario
(A1F1 scenario2) for the year 2100 (Climate Change 2007, The Physical Science Basis,
Summary for Policy Makers). After the first assessment report in 1990, the range of the
SLR predictions increased in 1995, followed by a decrease in subsequent reports (Figure
3.1), suggesting that the science has improved and uncertainty decreased after 2001.
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Figure 3.1. Sea level rise predictions published in different IPCC assessment reports. The
next assessment report is expected in 2013.

The IPCC is not the only body that has published and had an impact on the global
SLR discourse, but it is probably the most important one. One study by the World Bank
has had a particularly strong impact on the SLR discussion in Suriname. Dasgupta et al.
(2007) published a study in the same year as the AR4 report that analyzed the impact on
different sectors in the Caribbean and Latin America based on 1 to 5 meters SLR. These
elevations were based on the potential collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet which is
considered to be a low probability, and an event not considered by other studies. The
sectors that were analyzed for potential impact include agriculture, industry,
infrastructure and population (Figure 3.2). Suriname ranked either first or in the top three
of countries impacted for many of the sectors.

38

Figure 3.2. Population impacted by SLR in Latin America and the Caribbean. (Source:
Dasgupta et al., 2007)

The World Bank publication was reported in the mainstream media, and several
other people who are actively involved with climate change in Suriname have since
referenced this report during meetings and workshops. One widely circulated newspaper
ran an article (Figure 3.3b) soon after the publication with the headline “Five Meters Sea
Level Rise Makes Paramaribo Disappear” (Dagblad Suriname, November 2007).
Another popular paper, De Ware Tijd (DWT), published a similar article title “Effects of
Climate Change in Suriname Becoming Real,” with accompanying photo of what appears
to be people (clearly from another country) wading through chest-high water after severe
flooding (Figure 3.3b). A new SLR narrative was thus introduced with the World Bank
publication and continues to be retold in different ways by important actors who are
involved with developing climate change policy in Suriname.
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Figure 3.3a. Newspaper article based on World Bank report. Translation reads: “five
meters sea level rise makes Paramaribo disappear” (Dagblad Suriname, November 2007,
reprinted with permission).

Figure 3.3b. Newspaper article warning for the effects of sea level rise (DWT, November
2007, reprinted with permission).
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Referring back to the World Bank study, given that the worst case scenario
reported by the IPCC at this time was less than 1 meter by 2100, the World Bank results
could be misleading especially for people who do not have knowledge of the underlying
science of SLR models. One weakness of the analysis, which was rightfully explained by
the authors, is the relatively low resolution that was used: SLR was based on a 1
kilometer grid. As a result, many Caribbean islands were not included in the analysis
because their small sizes and mountainous terrains would give average values that were
significant misrepresentations of local realities.
While the discourse of SLR in Suriname was initially shaped by IPCC and World
Bank publications, a visit by scientists from the Delta Commission, The Netherlands, to
the University of Suriname played a small role as well. Scientists from different research
organizations in The Netherlands work at the Delta Commission and give advice to the
Dutch parliament on climate change vulnerability and adaptation. Given The
Netherlands’ historical ties with Suriname, low elevation, and prowess in coastal and
civil engineering, the Delta Commission publications carry significant weight and
received some notice in Suriname as well. The Delta Commission assumes a SLR of 55
to 120 cm by 2100 which significantly exceeds the IPCC predictions. These predictions
especially create more doubts about the validity of lower IPCC predictions. This is a
dominant theme in the local discourse as well: sea level rise will be much greater than
what has been published in the AR4. Suriname’s First National Communication to the
UNFCCC (FNC, 2005; also referred to as the Initial Communication to the UNFCCC),
for example, acknowledges the IPCC figure of 50cm (actually slightly higher than the
48cm that was published) but uses an exaggerated 1 meter SLR to study climate change
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vulnerability (Section 4.5.2 – Physical effects of flooding, salinity, intrusion and erosion).
The FNC report fails to provide clear references, however, of the source for using twice
the AR4 figure. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the different SLR values used in
official Surinamese reports and vulnerability analyses.
Table 3.1. Summary of SLR expectation.
Date
Report
1999
2006
2007
2007
2007
2008
2008

Suriname Vulnerability Assessment
Report
Towards ICZM in Suriname
Fourth Assessment Report
Impact of SLR in Latin America and
Caribbean
Environmental and Social Impact
Assessment
Working with Water: Findings of the
Dutch Delta Committee 2008
Netherlands Climate Assistance
Programme

Donor / Agency
Dutch
government
Royal Haskoning
(IaDB)
IPCC
World Bank

Expected SLR
in 2100 (m)
1.0
1.0
0.18 – 0.59
Up to 5

DHV Consultant
(Min. PLOS)
Delta Committee

0.39

Dutch
government

1.0 – 1.6

0.55 – 1.20

Other local studies give a similar grim picture of SLR in Suriname. The Suriname
Vulnerability Assessment (VA) Project (Ministry of Public Works 1999) states that
“Surinamese vulnerability was ranked as CRITICAL and protection measures were seen
to be immense” (p. i). This study received significant funding from the Dutch
government and was intended to bring awareness of Integrated Coastal Zone
Management (ICZM) in Suriname. It states in the executive summary that SLR “may not
exceed 0.5 m but the unknowns associated with predicting changing storm patterns and
intensities support the use of the conservative 1 m scenario” (page ii). This is, however,
related back to expected storm pattern conditions in the Netherlands which vary greatly
from those in Suriname. The link between these expected changes in wind patterns due to
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storms in the Netherlands and Suriname is not explained further so it remains unclear
why conditions in The Netherlands are used to predict conditions in Suriname. This claim
is even more questionable since the section on storm surges states that “winds are
generally weak without any storm surges” (page 26). Since The Netherlands is exposed to
storm surges and Suriname is not, the 1 m scenario should not have been supported.
The Suriname VA Project was the first in-depth analysis of SLR vulnerability and
such figures clearly influence the discourse on SLR and climate change. Suriname has a
relatively small number of people with expertise in hydrology, coastal morphology and
ecology, or oceanography, and this group is involved in nearly all projects related to
climate change and sea level rises. Consequently, when this group accepts a certain
discourse, it becomes dominant almost immediately. A SLR discourse that is therefore
developed at an early stage is afterwards repeated without new investigation. A reduction
of expected global SLR by the IPCC based on its previous predictions (between the
fourth and third assessment reports) did not persuade scientists to adjust the SLR
numbers locally.
Another relevant study which looked at the impacts of climate change in
Suriname, but with emphasis on the districts of Paramaribo and Wanica (where 60% of
the population of Suriname resides), was the Netherlands Climate Assistance Programme
Phase 2 (NCAP 2008). This project produced significant new analyses which continue to
be referenced by people working on climate change issues locally. It also uses a
prediction of 1 meter SLR based on the following: IPCC predictions of approximately 30
to 80 cm, subsidence of 20 to 40 cm, storm surges of 20 to 30 cm, and backwater effects
and “other anomalies” of approximately 10 cm. This translates to a range of 100 to 160
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cm and represents one of the few cases in the available literature on SLR impacts in
Suriname where the lower limit was chosen to study vulnerability rather than the more
conservative 160 cm, despite the fact that many of the same people who worked on
previous reports took part in this study.
An important problem with the SLR discourse is its focus on average long-term,
usually 90 to 100 years, sea level rise. Suriname has a tidal range between low and high
water of approximately 2.5 meters. This means that average SLR figure, which is the
focus of every available publication, is practically meaningless for short and intermediate
term planning. It is also important to understand that not only the high water marks are
important for understanding potential vulnerability to flooding and saltwater intrusion.
Low water is equally important for day-to-day water management and especially for wet
rice agriculture which is an important crop in Western Suriname. When talking to local
residents, this important distinction is immediately made. They understand that impacts
are felt at high and low water periods and they are concerned with the next crop cycle,
their kids’ generation and other immediate to short term indicators rather than the next
100 years.
While the SLR discourse is produced by international actors, it should not be
reproduced and applied locally where there is a disconnect between predicted rise and
local tidal range. An emphasis on mean SLR would be far more important for coastal
regions with minimal tidal range. Periodic high water events, not mean sea level rise,
should be the focus for regions like Suriname that experience several meters of tidal
ranges. These data are available from satellite monitoring programs and existing tide
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gauges and should be presented in the IPCC assessment reports to minimize further
confusion.

In Situ “Sea Level” Data. There have been few studies published in Suriname
that show actual trends of sea levels. I use sea level in quotation marks here because the
only available data are in rivers near the coast but not actually off shore. One study
reported an annual measured sea level rise of 1.1 mm for the period 1918-1968
(NEDECO, 1968). This translates to a 0.11 m natural SLR over 100 years; and “natural”
here refers to the period where contributions from anthropogenic greenhouse gases are
assumed to be negligible. The Maritime Authority is one of two agencies that collects
tide data in Suriname (the other being the ‘Waterloopkundige Dienst’ at the Ministry of
Public Works) and data were obtained from a gauge in the Suriname River, only a few
kilometers from the shore. The data are collected every 15 minutes with an accuracy of 1
centimeter (A. Amatali, personal communication, December 23, 2012). This gauge also
has the longest (mostly) intact tide data and is close enough to the Atlantic Ocean so that
a rise in the sea level would be noticeable in its records. The raw data have daily high and
low tide levels relative to the national datum, also called NSP4. Given the diurnal nature
of tides in Suriname, most days in the dataset have two values representing the peak low
and high water marks. The MAS performed quality control on the data and questionable
measurements were removed resulting in multiple data gaps. No data were available from
2000 to 2004 and several years have data that are less than 95% complete: 1999 – 57%;
2006 – 42%; 2008 – 91%; and 2009 – 35%. The data nevertheless provide sufficient
4

NSP was determined by continuously measuring the mean water level at the mouth of
the Suriname River during 1956.
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information for understanding basic trends. In order to view the long term trends in these
data, I calculated the monthly maximum and minimum values (see Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4. Monthly maximum high water and minimum low water levels at Suriname
River tide gauge. Missing data from 1999 to 2003 indicate equipment malfunction and
other gaps are due to poor data quality. Data source: Maritime Authority Suriname
(MAS).

Different forcing factors determine local tides and these can be predicted with
relative accuracy for several years. These are used to develop tide tables which are
utilized by the MAS for ship navigation. Coastal Suriname experiences very high tides
once or twice a year which results in flooding in rural and urban areas. Two additional
analyses were performed to better understand when extreme high and low tides occurred
(Figure 3.5). First, the (twice) daily high and low levels were calculated when these were
not provided by the MAS. The maximum monthly values of the mean daily high tide
measurements (blue line) and the once a year maximum high tide measurements (red
dots) were calculated. For example, the highest mean daily value for the month of
January 1987 was 296 cm based on the two high tide readings on January 31 (272 and
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307 cm) and the highest daily tide for all of 1987 was reached on August 11 at 323 cm.
Similarly, minimum monthly values of the mean daily low tides were calculated (pink
line). In order to find out when drainage by gravity would have been most challenging
(yellow dots), I first calculated the minimum of the low tides for each month. Next, I
calculated which month and day had the highest of these low tide events for each year.
For 1987, for example, I first calculated the lowest low tide mark for each month
resulting in 12 numbers. The highest of these was 67cm reached on September 7. The
other low tide mark for that day was 87 cm. While doing research, an extreme high tide
event occurred on March 29, 2009, and many farmers’ fields at WNZ were flooded with
seawater. River water also flowed freely into Paramaribo and probably crossed the 50
year flood mark for the city (dotted line) but these data were not available from the MAS
at the time of writing.

Figure 3.5. Water level at Maritime Authority of Suriname (MAS) gauge station located
at the mouth of the Suriname River. Dotted line indicates the 50 year flood level for
Paramaribo.

Sluice gate managers for four sluices in Paramaribo and Weg Naar Zee were
interviewed and they verified the data from the MAS. Managers from two main sluices in
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Paramaribo mentioned that they have had to rely more on the large pumps whereas they
previously relied more on gravity. Those who manage gates without pumps were
concerned that their job was becoming increasingly difficult as the window for letting
water drain by gravity was making their job increasingly challenging. One sluice
manager recalled that water in the Suriname River topped his sluice gate, something that
he had never witnessed before in 15 years of work. The implication of this is that while
rising sea levels may take a few years before its impacts are felt, the currently higher low
tides are already having an impact. Vulnerability assessments, however, focus primarily
on high water because the discourse has made it a natural tendency to think of flooding
being the primary impact from increasing sea levels rather than the inability to drain
regular excess waters.
While sea level rise over the long run is easier to predict than most other climate
change impacts, e.g. change in storm activity, it must be treated with caution because this
change will not be linear. As a result of its nonlinearity (Figure 3.6), SLR at any one
point in time is difficult to predict. It is expected that during one or more periods of
positive (or negative) feedback loops, greater (or lesser) SLR will occur over a short
period of time (i.e. points B and A in figure 3.6). It is possible that current SLR is a
reflection of point A when water level rise is relatively slow. Future rise, therefore, could
be more than 26 cm. The scientific community should assist with creating such a model
of expected increase over time, rather than only the absolute increase by 2100 years
because policy makers could become unnecessarily alarmed when point B is reached and
the projected overall rise would mistakenly be expected to be several meters. In the
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meantime, the local discourse has completely neglected to discuss the actual measured
SLR and insists on working with average long term predictions.

Figure 3.6. Negative and positive feedback loops will result in non-linear behavior of
SLR.
The non-linear actual increase is also expected for the land area that will be
inundated. In other words, the unit on the y-axis could be changed to total land area. As
topography is variable, some small increases in water level (point A) could inundate
much larger land areas when the level reaches a critical point in the topography.
Similarly, large increases in water level (point B) may not result in much more land being
inundated if the slope of the land is larger during this time. This argument may not be
important for the Suriname coast that is very flat and low-lying. Topographic changes are
thus minimal.

Variables that Determine Local Sea Levels. While SLR is easier to predict than
changes in precipitation patterns, for example, it is still important to understand the
regional variability as well. Climate related SLR will mainly come from two sources:
49

additional water from melting glaciers and expansion of the oceans as a result of warming
waters. Several other factors which operate at different frequencies and magnitudes also
determine sea level near Suriname. High frequency events are waves and diurnal tides
resulting from the earth’s rotation and gravitational forces (e.g. from the relative position
of the moon). Low frequency events such as El Nino also play a role since warmer sea
temperatures cause expansion of water volume. Three low frequency events are the
Atlantic Multi-decadal Oscillation (AMO) which is a 65-80 year cycle during which
temperatures in the Atlantic vary about 0.4 degrees C, the North Atlantic Oscillation
(NAO), and the 16.8 year cycle during which time the moon is positioned more closely or
distantly to earth and results in a change of 12 cm in sea levels due to the gravitational
pull. The moon cycle is discussed in greater detail below. The point here is that little
attention is paid to the interaction of multiple cyclical factors and such variables will have
an impact on regional SLR over time and, therefore, the shape of the curve in Figure 3.6.
The additive nature of these different factors could even result in a relative decrease of
sea levels over a short period of time. Since these issues are not addressed when making
SLR predictions, the SLR discourse remains incomplete.

Mangrove Destruction Discourses

The approximately 390 kilometer coastline of Suriname is characterized by three
prominent features. First, a combination of mangrove forests (predominantly Avicennia
germinans or black mangroves) and mudbanks dominate the coastline and coastal
geomorphology. Second, brackish and freshwater lagoons, locally called pannen, have
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developed immediately south of the mangrove belt, especially in the western part of the
country. These remain important areas for migratory birds, provide income opportunities
from tourism, and are important sources of fish protein for coastal communities. Third,
the low-lying (approximately 1 meter above sea level) coast consists largely of clay soils
but is interspersed by east-west ridges of sand and shell deposits. These are 2 to 3 meters
above sea level and major road infrastructure has historically been built on these ridges.
The features described are located in the geologic Young Coastal Plain which is
approximately 20km wide and was formed during the Holocene (Noordam 2007). The
remaining major physiographic region of Suriname are the Old Coastal Plain
(Pleistocene), Savanna Belt (Late Tertiary), and the Interior which is part of the
Precambrian Guyana Shield (Noordam 2007).
The so-called “wild coast” of Suriname borrows its name from the complex
dynamics that continuously shape and reshape the coastline. Mudbanks and mangroves
together are involved in a slow process of land acquisition and land loss. Mudbanks are
formed by the interaction of silt and clay from the Amazon River and trade wind
generated wave action (Augustinus, 2004; Allison et al., 2000). They are in the order of
20 and 30 kilometers long and move in a westerly direction at an average rate of 1.5
kilometers per year (Augustinus, 2004) (see Figure 3.7). While mudbanks provide the
first line of defense by dampening wave action and allowing mangroves to recover and
land to accumulate, the coastline between mudbanks is protected by mangroves alone and
normally erodes. This cycle of erosion and accretion has been taking place for thousands
of years and has a net effect of land accumulation (Augustinus, 2004).
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Figure 3.7. Sketch of coastal mudbank processes in Suriname. (Modified from
Augustinus, 2004).

When viewed from the shore, mudbanks look like flat mirror-like stretched areas
of calm water with small ripples. Viewed from above, the boundaries of the mudbank can
be distinguished by the presence or absence of waves. The presence of small mangroves
close to the shoreline is also a good indication that larger waves are absent and a
mudbank is present (see Figure 3.8). Avicennia germinans are fast growing trees with a
main trunk that can reach heights of 15 meters. Avicennia root systems give it the ability
to establish in shallow tidal water, being able to be completely submerged for periods of
time. Each tree has hundreds of small roots (pneumatophores) protruding from the soil
upward preventing the tree from suffocating.
The international discourse on mangroves goes something like this: mangroves
play an important part in shaping the physical coastline by trapping sediments and
stabilizing the coast. They provide important social and ecological services such as
filtering and trapping pollutants, providing important habitat for a large numbers of
(economically important) species, and providing wood for fuel or building materials
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(McLeod and Salm, 2006). The annual global economic value of these services is
estimated to be $200,000 - $900,000 per hectare (Wells et al., 2006).

Figure 3.8. Young mangroves (Avicennia germinans) growing along the coast with presence of a
mudbank (photo: D. Hoekman)

Mangrove trees provide coastal protection primarily through their extensive root
systems. Aside from trapping sediments, mangrove roots and trees absorb wave energy
which provides natural protection against normal wave energy as well as severe storms.
Mangroves are especially important in storm protection from high winds and strong
waves (Kathiresan and Rajendran, 2005) while their role in protection against storm
surges is still debated (Feagin et al, 2010).
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Mangrove root systems that are commonly referred to in such discourses are the
stilt root types. Only Rhizophora mangle, or red mangrove, have such root systems in
Suriname and this species is not dominant along the Suriname coast. Instead, it can be
found in greater abundance along the shores of coastal rivers and creeks. Their role in
coastal protection from waves is therefore minimal in Suriname. Where patches of red
mangroves do exist along the coastline, they withstand wave energy exceptionally well
but their overall presence is still minimal. Laguncularia racemosa or white mangrove is
the third mangrove species in Suriname but this smaller plant is also found along river
and creek shores and not at all along the coast.
Black mangroves along the entire Guiana shoreline, which encompasses Suriname
along with Guyana and French Guiana, provide coastal protection in tandem with
mudbanks. Mangroves and mudbanks, together, are involved in a slow cyclical process of
land acquisition and land loss (Augustinus 1968, 2004). Mudbanks provide the first and
most important ‘line of defense’ by dampening wave action and allowing mangroves to
recover and land to accumulate. Where mudbanks are absent, as they continuously move
west, mangroves provide the second line of protection. Augustinus has been studying
these systems for several decades in the Guianas and his research shows that a specific
location has 20 to 30 years of protection from waves where mangroves will usually
establish and grow into dense forests. The coastline between mudbanks normally erodes
because Avicennia alone, in the absence of fluid mud, cannot stop erosion from wave
energy (see Figure 3.9). This cycle of erosion and accretion has been taking place for
thousands of years and has a net effect of land accumulation (Augustinus, 2004).
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Figure 3.9. Mature mangrove die-off and coastal erosion in the absence of a mudbank
(photo: D. Hoekman).

Discourse about coastal protection from SLR is still mostly focused on mangroves
and seawalls, while mudbanks seem to play a minor role. These discourses include
concepts of mangrove ‘destruction’ by humans who are either unknowingly removing
mangrove trees, i.e. for construction materials, or knowingly destroying mangrove forests
for financial profit such as land developers. An example of the ‘destruction’ discourse is
visible in the mangrove awareness poster produced by a local conservation organization
(see Figure 3.10). While the text speaks of the importance of mangroves for coastal
protection, the photos are of red mangroves which are not present in significant numbers
along the coast. The campaign also addresses destruction of mangroves by humans but
the accompanying photos show mangrove trees which are destroyed by wave action
which is a natural process. Such images are common in the mangrove destruction
discourses in Suriname and are continuously repeated in awareness materials.
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Figure 3.10. Part of a mangrove awareness poster which reads: Protect our mangrove
forest, Protect our coastline! The mangrove species in the image are not common along
the coast however (photo: R. Nijbroek).

Government officials who are involved with developing coastal management
plans commonly repeat the mangrove destruction discourse as follows: people have been
and are still removing mangroves trees and they are responsible for the erosion problems
that coastal communities are confronted with in different locations in Suriname. One
member of the technical team responsible for developing the ICZM plan even spoke of
“large-scale destruction of mangrove forests” (Deltares workshop, Krasnapolski Hotel,
April 2009). When I asked the respondents who was removing mangroves at such scales
and why they were doing it, the answer was much less obvious.
The majority of government officials that I interviewed concluded that fishermen
were primarily responsible for the removal of mangroves. These officials believe that
fishermen harvest mangrove trees for smoking fish. Fishermen and fish smokers who I
interviewed acknowledged that they prefer parwa wood for smoking fish but they
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explained that they did not remove live trees because these do not burn as the wood is too
wet. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult to wade through mudflats to get to the
trees and then haul them back to their boats. If trees were removed where there are no
mudflats, the constant beating of waves would make it dangerous to cut down trees.
Instead, fishermen collect dead parwa trees. These can be found in places where
mudbanks are absent, trees have been knocked down by wave action, and have
accumulated. Such areas are locally referred to as parwa cemeteries and can be found all
along the coast where mudbanks are absent. It is still difficult and dangerous to collect
dead trees because of the continuous waves that crash into the boat, so the wood is only
collected at low tides. One coastal ecologist also explained that the parwa cemeteries
provide additional protection from wave areas since they function as natural temporary
seawalls. It is correct to assume that if these accumulations of dead tree trunks were to be
removed, it would cause increased erosion but the scale at which fishermen collect the
dead trees is insignificant compared to the size of these patches. People involved in
smoking fish also use a local tree species called swit bontji as an alternative fuel, but the
parwa wood is preferred because it gives the smoked fish a desired reddish brown color
which must be done manually with soy sauce when swit bontji is used.
The destruction discourse also assumes that fishermen use parwa trees as poles
that are placed in the river for attaching fishing nets. This has been disputed by the
fishermen that I interviewed. They explained that alternative wood species from the
forest last much longer and therefore do not have to be replaced as frequently as parwa.
Residents at WNZ explained that parwa is occasionally used for construction but again,
parwa wood is deemed too soft and does not last as long as other hard woods that are
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readily available. Even if fishermen collected parwa wood for smoking fish or for
construction materials, the number of fishermen in Suriname is very small relative to the
size of parwa forests. Clearly, these narratives add to the confusion of the mangroves
discourse and its role in adaptation to SLR in Suriname.
Developers are also part of the destruction discourse and have been known to
clear land for creating parcels. The northern fringe of Paramaribo, especially, has grown
rapidly during the building boom of the last decade. As my research focused on periurban and rural areas where developers are not part of the local narrative, I did not
include developers’ perspectives or voices in my analysis. It is clear that this group has
significant political power in Suriname however. Their positions are never elaborated in
the local media in response to public criticism, and if I had attempted to collect data from
this group, it may not have been possible because the exact identities of the people who
develop the urban fringes of Paramaribo remain unclear. Despite the concern that this
group is not included in the analysis, it should be noted that much of this area is actually
not mangrove forests but it is nevertheless low lying swamp land not suitable for housing
without proper drainage infrastructure and flood prevention mechanisms. It is my opinion
that these swamp forests should not be cleared because their function in flood prevention
is removed, and it will cost the state much more to keep these areas dry in the future. In
the case that future erosion would require mangroves to move further inland, these
natural swamp areas would naturally change from mixed wetland vegetation to
mangroves. Indeed, physical barriers to upland migration of mangroves are one of the
constraints of sea level rise adaptation (McLeod and Salm, 2006).
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There is no history of large scale conversion from mangroves to development in
the study areas but rather land use change involving new agricultural lands. Polders were
established close to the shoreline in Coronie, and land was initially converted to rice
plantations at Weg Naar Zee but is now mostly used for cattle and vegetables at a smaller
scale. The GOS had a policy that encouraged people to bring land into production. Early
settlers at Weg Naar Zee in the 1960’s and 70’s explained that official land tenure could
only be obtained if they showed proof of agricultural production on the land. This
involved (1) digging drainage channels to remove any excess water and (2) removal of
vegetation such as mangroves. Many farmers in Coronie obtained loans from the
Agricultural Bank of Suriname to bring coastal lands into production. Immediately after
the military regime took power in Suriname in 1980, land reform legislation also allowed
squatters to obtain land rights if they showed proof of bringing land into production.
Interviews with WNZ occupants who arrived during this period tell similar stories. A
fervent supporter of the new military regime even purchased a large tract of land
(estimated at 20 hectares) close to the shoreline, removed all the mangrove vegetation,
and planted coconut trees. One local correspondent remembered a large sign that was
erected that read “In Support of the Revolution.” The early 1980’s, however, coincided
with the period when the mudbank was near the end of its presence at the WNZ coastline
and the area started experiencing erosion just at this time. Unfortunately for the political
supporter, the coconut plantation never reached production capacity as the shoreline
started eroding. This area is still subject to annual erosion and many coconut trees can
still be seen to disappear in the ocean as the shoreline advances at astonishing rates. Local
residents believe that if mangroves had been standing here instead, the shoreline would
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not experience the rate of erosion that can be witnessed today, calculated at 50 meters per
year, a figure that has been verified by local residents. It remains one of the highest rates
of erosion of any area near Paramaribo.

Mangrove Rehabilitation. Mangrove planting and rehabilitation is a common
climate change adaptation response across the world. This practice has successfully
shown to reduce vulnerability to storm surge. Red mangrove, or other mangrove species
with stilt roots, are normally used for mangrove rehabilitation. The dynamics of black
mangrove forests on the coast in Suriname are generally not well understood. Local
respondents indicate that black mangroves (Avicennia germinans) can reach mature
heights of 15 to 20 meters in 5 to 6 years. According to Gratiot et al. (2008), referring to
black mangroves in French Guiana, such “communities can be wiped out extensively
during interbank phases, but can reappear in the same proportions within a period of two
years” (p. 3). Such growth rates put into question the common assumption that
mangroves should never be removed or whether active planting makes economic sense.
Immediately after a mudbank establishes itself along the coast, a mangrove forest
could in theory be harvested sustainably because a mature forest would be standing in its
place by the time the interbank period arrives. It is also worth testing whether an
established forest with only mature trees (fewer trees with larger trunk sizes) can absorb
wave energy better than a forest with more young trees of only a few years old. These
questions and many more are a matter of management practices, specifically adaptive
management, which emphasize learning and experimentation with management methods.
The government department in charge of coastal management, Natuur Beheer (Nature
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Management), does not, however, have the capacity to do coastal management at the
moment. While almost the entire coastline is under some form of protected status, socalled Multi-Use Management Areas, there is no active management taking place.
Augustinus (2004) has estimated that the constant process of erosion and
accretion has a net effect of coastal accretion over long time scales. In a summary of
Augustinus’ findings, Berrenstein (2010) points to the relationship between mudbank
length and accretion. The longer the mudbank, the more time there is for mangroves to
establish, and thereby resulting in a growing coastline. Mudbanks in western Suriname
appear to be shorter than those along the eastern shore which has resulted in a slower rate
of coastal accretion near Coronie (west). Mudbank length appears to be related to the
direction or position of the coastline in relation to the wind direction and speed
(Berrenstein, 2010). Wind direction which is more perpendicular to the coast will result
in shorter mudbanks and less accretion. It remains difficult to separate the relative
influence of mudbanks and human actions in areas such as Coronie and WNZ however.
In the study by Gratiot et al. (2008), the scale of coastline dynamics was
addressed in a much different way. They analyzed the impact of the 18.6 year lunar cycle
relative to the impact of sea level rise on coastal erosion in French Guiana. The study
focused on coastline where human influence is minimal and therefore gives a good
picture of coastal processes in the absence of anthropogenic modifications. They found
that periods of high water from the lunar cycle have a greater impact on mangrove loss
than interbank periods. During extreme high water events, large areas of mangrove forest
can become submerged resulting in massive die-off of black mangroves. This
phenomenon has also been described by Teunissen (2004, internal nota) and designated
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as a critical area for coastal management in Suriname. Gratiot et al. (2008) found that
during the 18.6 year cycle, mean high water (MHW) fluctuated approximately 0.12
meters, and these periods of extreme high and low water account for most of the
mangrove loss and gain. Up to 2 km was lost during the cycle peak period, and 3 km of
mangrove forest was gained during the cycle low period, regardless of the
presence/absence of mudbanks. SLR was also found to play a factor, and major ENSO
events additionally play a role in disturbing the lunar cycle. This study is significant in
that it points to a major contribution of mangrove loss that is neither related to mudbanks
nor to human removal, but nevertheless one which is completely missing from the
mangrove destruction discourse in Suriname.
Two other studies bring into question the commonly accepted discourse that
mangroves will retreat along the Suriname coast during periods of SLR and that
mangrove forests, therefore, need to be rehabilitated to increase their resilience. Noordam
(2011), in his assessment of climate change impacts on ecosystems in Suriname,
references the two important studies by Ellison and Stoddart (1991) and Parkinson et al
(1994), who did analyses of what happened to mangrove ecosystems in the Caribbean
during the early Holocene, a period roughly 9 to 6 million years ago during which time
sea levels rose at 6 mm per year, more than twice as fast as is predicted for the next
century. Ellison and Stoddart found that red mangroves (Rhizophora mangle) would be
more resistant to SLR than black mangroves (Avicennia germinans) in timescales of
multiple generations. Red mangroves are known to be more robust to greater tidal
fluctuations than black mangroves but do not tolerate very high salinity (Hogart, 2007).
Meanwhile, Parkinson et al. (1994) found that black mangroves would essentially not
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migrate landward as long as the supply of sediments remains uninterrupted. Indeed,
during the early Holocene when sea levels were rising faster than they are predicted to
rise in the near future, the Suriname coast continued to grow.

Conclusions

IPCC figures of average SLR are the predominant ones used by small and big
governments around the world. These figures, 18 to 58 cm by 2100, have a large range
and are unsuitable for most local conditions because they represent a global mean SLR.
Since national governments often lack downscaled data, the figures can create confusing
discourses. Several other problems exist. A lack of accounting for regional variations
from different phenomena that influence sea levels creates additional confusion. Finally,
a tendency to focus on the extreme, in some cases even SLR figures that are outside the
normal range, leads to expectations of entire cities disappearing over a short time period.
The danger is that such discourses can lead to dominant discourses that make it difficult
to develop appropriate adaptation strategies.
Global strategies of using mangroves to combat SLR stem from the expectation
that mangroves can reduce damage from high winds, erosion and storm surges. They are
also able to keep up with gradual SLR by trapping sediments and producing peat from
decaying litter and root growth (McLeod and Salm, 2006). If SLR is too fast, however,
the ability to migrate inland to higher ground will become the limiting and determining
factor for mangrove survival (Ibid). The rate of SLR at which mangroves can continue to
trap sediments and maintain a presence or even raise the shoreline is unknown. Given
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that black mangroves can establish dense mature stands of trees in 5 to 6 years, they
should theoretically be able to keep up with SLR and inland migration. On the other
hand, obstacles such as dams or roads will inhibit the migration of coastal mangroves.
The relative importance of mudbanks should not be understated. While the
discourse of coastal protection tends to focus on mangroves alone, it is the presence of
mudbanks that determines how well the coastline is protected. In addition, it must not be
forgotten that mudbanks are primarily determined by sediment supply from the Amazon
River. The mangrove and mudbank systems together are extremely important for coastal
protection. The relative impact of human activity on mangrove and mudbank function
and the overall effect on the coast is of particular interest. Research on mangrove systems
in general is readily available, but research on mudbank movement is in its infancy and
can be found in only a handful of publications on the Guiana coast mudbanks. Moreover,
the symbiotic relationship between black mangroves (the dominant species) and
mudbanks in Suriname is a unique relationship not found in other parts of the world.
Residents at WNZ expressed awareness of the concept schermbos which is
defined as a stroke of land 500 meters wide on either side of rivers, or 200 meters near
creeks, that is legally protected and may not be removed (Ministerial order S.B 2005 no.
16). Many policy makers advocate for inclusion of mangroves in schermbos which would
criminalize parwa removal. Given what is known of mangrove ecology and growth rates
this would penalize sustainable harvesting of mangroves unnecessarily. Local knowledge
of parwa indicates that they reach maturity within two to six years. Gratiot et. al. (2008)
explain, in reference to parwa in French Guiana, that “communities can be wiped out
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extensively during interbank phases, but can reappear in the same proportions within a
period of two years” (p. 3).
Mangroves behave differently along the northeast South American coast than
elsewhere such as the Pacific. The commonly accepted discourse that mangroves will
retreat with SLR probably holds true for most places but not where mangroves interact
with large influxes of sediments which they continuously trap to create a growing
shoreline. The two papers referenced by Noordam (2011) (see Ellison and Stoddart,
1991, and Parkinson et al., 1994) as well as his explanation point to coastal mangrove
system that keeps growing (out and up) with increasing sea levels as long as the
sediment supply remains uninterrupted. The source of these sediments is the Amazon
River, and they are transported by several currents and trade winds. It is highly unlikely
that the source of the sediments would be discontinued given the sheer size of the
Amazon delta. Even when multiple hydroelectric dams are built upstream in the Andes
mountains, the Amazon will continue to purge large amounts of sediments. There is some
debate about whether the system of global deep sea and surface currents could slow down
or maybe stop altogether with climate change, and this should be investigated further.
This scenario would, however, likely bring about far reaching consequences for the
global population and it is therefore pointless to debate the impact of a slowing
“conveyor belt” on coastal mangroves in Suriname.
It is important that I clarify that I believe SLR will be a major challenge for
coastal populations, and I do not advocate in any way that coastal mangroves will
eliminate future SLR impacts. As long as there is urbanization on low-lying lands or
those not suitable for construction, rising sea level will enter these areas through creeks
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and rivers and they will become inundated during high tides. Many of the agricultural
lands that have subsided as a result of drying or oxidation will remain very low. A proper
cost benefit analysis should be done to see if these should be protected from future
flooding. Areas with cultural value that have also subsided are more challenging to
address. In any case, a proper vulnerability assessment should be completed using
existing local and scientific knowledge keeping in mind the multiple incomplete
discourses that “muddy the waters” so to speak. This should provide the best, most costeffective, adaptation strategies to SLR.
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CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORIES OF DEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCE

Introduction

In this chapter I examine the historical development path of Suriname and how
this may influence future adaptations to climate change. The focus is on particular
environmental, political and development histories that have shaped the Surinamese way
of knowing the world. This discourse is important for understanding why certain
adaptation decisions are favored over others and how governance is expected and
accepted to be structured by local communities. In addition, the relationship between
environmental histories and particular development ideologies can give insight into local
perceptions of normative adaptation. Situated environmental science for climate change
adaptation requires an understanding of local environmental histories because it gives
insight to how a place came to be structured and textured and what future adaptations
may be environmentally, culturally and politically appropriate. Environmental histories
can also explain how local knowledge is expressed by local communities (Crumley 2002)
which I explore further in chapter 4. A development history of Suriname would, however,
require many volumes and is outside the scope of this research. I therefore limited my
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focus to recent development initiatives and environmental changes in the district of
Coronie.

Historical Development of Suriname

For over 200 years, Suriname was one of The Netherlands’ wealthiest plantation
colonies (Price and Price 1992)5. Throughout Dutch colonial rule, slaves were brought
from West Africa and contract laborers were brought from China, India and Indonesia
(Java) after the abolition of slavery in 1863 to work on abandoned plantations and
support the local economy which started to fail. As a result, the population is currently
very diverse with no ethnic group constituting a simple majority. During the 20th century,
Suriname also attained strategic geopolitical importance when large deposits of bauxite
were discovered, which is used for aluminum extraction. Suriname became an important
supplier of the precious metal during WWII when supplies were critically needed for the
manufacturing of Allied war planes.
Unlike Dutch and British colonizers in Guyana, for the most part colonizers did
not establish plantations along the coastline in Suriname, but instead along the banks of
major and minor rivers in young and old coastal plains. Shoreline development in Guyana
resulted in subsequent problems with erosion and flooding, and soon after independence
in 1966, a seawall was constructed to protect the population in Georgetown, Guyana’s
capital city, from floods. Despite these efforts, occasional problems persist with the
seawall and storms continue to cause flooding in coastal communities in Guyana (Pelling,
5

The colony was such a priced procession that it was eagerly traded for New Amsterdam
(currently New York City) at the Peace Treaty of Breda in 1776.
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1999). These hazards are very costly for Guyana, a financial burden that Suriname has
thus far largely escaped.
Another major factor in Suriname’s development path over the last three decades
has been Dutch development assistance. Dutch Development Aid started in 1975 when
Suriname became an independent state from Holland and the Dutch government agreed
to give 4 billion Dutch guilders (Nf) as Development Aid (the GOS has over time
increasingly criticized this terminology arguing that the funds are not Dutch funds given
to the Surinamese as a sign of goodwill, but rather Surinamese assets that the Dutch have
taken over time through colonization and slavery and are now returning). When Mr.
Bouterse took over power by force in 1980, the standard of living was relatively high,
primarily supported by the bauxite industry and Development Aid, but the public was
also increasingly dissatisfied with political corruption and cronyism. Mr. Bouterse’s
leftist dictatorship initially received support from the public as well as the Dutch. As
Schalkwijk (2010) explains:
“the change of power [in 1980] resulted in a new [political] reality which could be
witnessed from the increase in development aid distribution of Nf232 and Nf260
million in 1981 and 1982 respectively; two of the highest fund payouts between
1975 and 2008. There was also relatively high public support. That support was
squandered when 15 opposition members were executed in an attempt to stop the
increasing support for a return to democracy” (p. 42).

Since 1982 when the Bouterse regime entered a new phase by executing political
opponents, distribution of aid either slowed down or completely stopped during periods
when a pro-Bouterse government was in power (see Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1. History of Dutch Development Aid Interruptions (source: Schalkwijk, 2010)
1982 – 1987: Complete stop of development aid
1987:
Democratic elections are held and an anti-Bouterse government assumes
power
1987 – 1990: Partial aid with new demands
1990 – 1991: Complete stop after Bouterse takes over power again in the evening of
December 25th
1991:
Elections are held and a similar anti-Bouterse regime with Mr. Venetiaan
as president assumes power again
1992 – 1995: Continuation with new restrictions
1995:
All restrictions are removed
1996:
Pro-Bouterse government completes a “parliamentary coupe” and assumes
power
1997 – 2000: Complete stop of Aid
2000 - 2010: Anti-Bouterse coalition with Mr. Venetiaan assuming the presidency wins
consecutive elections and Development Aid is resumed.

Meanwhile, all these developments have impacted coastal geomorphic processes
too. Urban expansion and infrastructure projects as well as some agribusinesses during
the last few decades have created the biggest impacts. Changes in land cover near the
northern edge of Paramaribo are common and increasingly larger ditches and canals are
created to remove excess water from farmland in West Suriname. These anthropogenic
activities have led to increased vulnerability of coastline erosion in certain areas. One
such area is the western district of Coronie where the government is currently
constructing a seawall to stop shoreline erosion which would have resulted in the loss of
agricultural land and potential damage to the main road connecting Paramaribo to the
westerly district of Nickerie.
Coastal challenges are not limited to ecological challenges alone, however, but
are also shaped by political struggles. Several coastal indigenous communities in
Suriname, for example, are in the process of taking legal action against the state for the
recognition of land rights. Legal proceedings against the state should come as no surprise
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because these communities have been involved in struggles over similar issues in the past
when the Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) was granted concessions in
indigenous territories and started mining operations in the 1920s (Kambel and McKay
1999). Complicating matters, the state established a series of Multi-Use Management
Areas (MUMAs) which are considered "areas where integrated management by or on
behalf of the Government is needed for a rational use of its natural resources" (Teunissen
2003). Traditional indigenous territories overlap with the North-Commewijne and
Marowijne MUMA which was established by 2002 and could become a conflict of land
rights in the future.

Historical Development of Coronie

Totness is the administrative capital of Coronie and was first settled by Europeans
in the late 1790s6. Sixty percent of the district's population of 3000, which is
predominantly Creole7, lives in Totness which is situated on a narrow strip of land
between the dynamic coastline in the north and the 3500 km2 Coronie Swamp to the
south. The main road that passes through Totness, the Oost-West Verbinding (East-West
Connection), was built on a ridge similar to those in WNZ. Coronie has a high
unemployment rate of 30% (ABS 2009) and is politically important because 4% of
6

The earliest signs of human occupation dates from 300 AD (van der Veen et al., 2010).
Pottery, now called Mabaruma-pottery, dated from this period was found in Western
Coronie. It is believed that the indigenous people that these belonged to, lived on shell
ridges, practiced agriculture and practiced hunting and fishing (van der Veen et al., 2010
– original source: Suralco Magazine 1983, vol 15, no 1).
7

Creoles and maroons are both descendants of Africans. A distinction is made between
Creoles who live in urban areas and Maroons who live in traditional communities along
major rivers in the Interior.
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members of parliament are represented by the district which has only 0.6% of the total
population.
The District of Coronie used to be known as the Land of Milk and Honey
reflecting a history of economic prosperity and apparent abundant natural resources. It
achieved this title a century ago when Coronie had a small but thriving community.
Respondents in this study have told stories of a community in the mid-20th century with
strong social networks and seemingly living in tune with its harsh and dynamic
environment. Coronie remained isolated until the early 1950’s when a road was
constructed connecting it to the capital city Paramaribo and ferries allowed people to
cross the large Saramakka and Coppename rivers. The expensive trip from Paramaribo to
Coronie may have taken several days by steam or sail boat, but the road connection made
the trip much more feasible in terms of time and cost. Shortly after the road to Coronie
was built, it was continued to the Westerly community of Nieuw Nickerie. Bridges were
later built across the Saramakka River (1978) and Coppename River (1999) completely
unlocking the district from Paramaribo.
In their recent publication Dreamers, Fearmongers and Go-getters: stories of
people and buildings in Coronie, van der Veen et al (2010) have done a commendable
job of searching through archives to uncover the history of Coronie. This publication is
truly unique for its archival research of the West Indian Company (WIC - West Indische
Compagnie) which was a privately owned entity in Holland, and partly owned and
managed Suriname as a colony in the late 17th century. WIC owned the colony with the
city of Amsterdam and the wealthy Dutch businessman Cornelis van Aerssen van
Sommelsdijck, who became the first governor upon entering the business partnership.
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WIC’s responsibility was the delivery of slaves from Africa to Suriname for which it
received 5000 pounds of sugar per slave. Between 1680 and 1780, the number of slaves
in Suriname increased from 2,800 to 53,000 (van der Veen et al. 2010). Much of the
writing that follows is based on the research by van der Veen at al.
The first plantations were established near Coronie in the late 1790’s by then
governor Jurriaan François de Frederici along the Nickerie River. Global economic
changes dictated which crops were grown in Coronie for much of the next decades.
Globally, cotton production was fueled by demand from the Industrial Revolution taking
place in England. Van de Veen et al. (2010) indicate that the combination of clay soils
combined with an ocean breeze made Coronie a prime location for cotton production. As
a result of English “occupation” of the colony between 1799 and 1802, and again from
1804 to 1816, early settlers in Coronie were also English. The first plantation in Coronie,
called Burnside, was established by Alex Cameron in 1808. Many more British followed
and this short English ownership is still reflected in many plantation names such as
Friendship, Hamilton, Oxford and Bucklebury. By 1832, Coronie had 22 cotton
plantations and 2,278 slaves registered who produced an average of 2000 to 5000 bales of
raw cotton.
Coronie became a prosperous and independent “colony within a colony” for
several reasons. Van der Veen et al (2010) identify the following important factors which
set Coronie apart from the rest of Suriname at the time: work on cotton plantations was
less demanding and the coastal climate was healthier than in the interior. Most diseases
and epidemics also didn’t reach Coronie because of its isolation. Unlike the Dutch
plantation owners who lived in Paramaribo and had their plantations managed by
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plantation officers, the British lived in Coronie on their plantations. I suspect that it must
have also been uncomfortable for the newly arrived British to live among Dutch
colonizers who had just become occupied themselves. Nevertheless, the British
colonizers experimented in Coronie with crop varieties and new technologies, both aiding
the local cotton industry. Finally, colonizers in Coronie suffered fewer losses from
escaped slaves because Coronie was bordered in the south by the extremely large Coronie
Swamp, although this was only true for the first few decades until slavery was abolished
in neighboring Guyana in 1834 and slaves managed to escape along the coast to its
Westerly neighbor.
Cotton production continued to create wealth for the planters in Coronie and
cotton prices reached a global peak during the American Civil War between 1861 and
1865. American cotton producers had made America the biggest cotton producer in the
world at the beginning of the century, but the war reduced supply, thus increasing prices
on the demand side. Cotton production in Suriname suddenly ceased in 1885 however
when cotton production in the US again increased after the end of the war and local
producers could no longer compete.
The second half of the 19th century saw many changes for the district. First,
slavery was abolished in 1834 in English territories and in 1863 in Dutch territories. As a
result of this 29 year wait, slaves started escaping from Coronie plantations to find
freedom in Guyana. Archives from Coronie registries show that 964 men and 1,012
women received their freedom on July 1st, 1863. By July 6th, it is explained that free
slaves had to decide which plantation they would work on for payment. Personal rights
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remain limited, however, and working conditions suboptimal. Moreover, the cotton
industry collapsed around this time which did not bode well for the local economy.

Land of Milk and Honey. Van der Veen et al (2010) describe a different ending
to the century than what may be expected given the turn of events. While the rest of the
colony struggled to replace the slave-based economic model, Coronie recovered
relatively quickly and started to prosper again. Most plantation owners left the district
after they could not profit from the competitive US producers and new labor costs
(despite being compensated 300 Dutch guilders per slave). In the process of leaving,
something unusual happened: plantation owners sold parts of the plantations to the slaves
who in turn started farming cassava, cacao, bananas, maize and fruits. A local honey
industry developed based on honey from mangrove flowers, so called parwa honey. The
new landowners soon introduced cattle and chickens to their diversified livelihoods base.
As always, there was plenty of fish from the nearby freshwater swamps and Atlantic
Ocean. The departure of the colonizers after abolition of slavery and the selfdetermination and knowledge of local farming techniques that freed slaves had acquired
combined with Coronie’s isolation was unique for Suriname and set off a trajectory of
affluence.
In an attempt to become self-sufficient in cooking oil, palms were introduced for
palm oil production. This evolved into a thriving economy based on palm oil and pigs.
Palm oil production produced a “waste” product, locally called kopra, which was perfect
feed for pigs. A local respondent recalled that Coronie pigs were very large and the meat
was lean, and thus pig meat, along with honey and palm oil became the basis for the local
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economy. In order to keep up with high Demand, new land was put into production. This
model continued from the end of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century when
the new road was constructed from Paramaribo to Coronie.
This short history of how the Land of Milk and Honey was borne out of ingenuity
and perseverance is one of many interesting parts of this region. Another is the ethnic
diversity of the district. After most Dutch plantation owners left Coronie, the only people
left were ex-slaves. However, in an effort to stimulate the economy and address the labor
shortage after 1863, the Dutch brought cheap labor from East, South and Southeast Asia.
In the period between 1853 and 1939, the Dutch brought 74,000 new laborers to
Suriname from Madeira (1%), China (3%), currently Pakistan (4%), India (47%) and
Java, Indonesia (44%). While most contract workers arrived in Suriname with the
expectation to leave again after their contract was finished, few actually left, and
Suriname became one of the most ethnically diverse places globally. Most Chinese
settled in Coronie as well as a few Javanese. Interestingly, the Chinese arrivals were all
men and when they settled in Coronie, most married free slaves. As van der Veen et al
(2010) explain, one can still find Chinese family names in Coronie such as Tjon A Kon,
Tjon A Fo, and Chong A Fong (without being able to notice any trace of Chinese
ancestry in the people’s appearances).
The people of Coronie have exhibited a keen knowledge of their environment.
Van der Veen et al (2010) explain how people’s knowledge of mudbanks helped them
with the constant struggle to transport goods via small boats (kotters), sometimes
transferring the load to bigger sailboats awaiting offshore, that made the journey to
Paramaribo and back. Canals had to be maintained in order for the economy to function.
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Van der Veen et al (2010) note that the first group of Chinese arrivals in fact worked on
cleaning the main canal. Feller also makes note of this group but believes that the
Chinese immigrants were brought to Coronie only for this task. Either way, the local
population must have done maintenance of the canals as well. As one informant
explained, “[that water has to flow from the swamp to the sea] is common knowledge.
Everybody in Coronie can tell you how this works, because this is how we have always
lived. Water has to flow to the ocean and then we also have plenty of fish” (Key
informant #20, March 3, 2010). This could have happened in two ways. Exporters of
goods paid for labor directly or it was done by a community group in a collaborative way.
Much other work was done collaboratively as key informant #21 explained (March 18,
2010): “we all planted rice, every house in Coronie planted rice … our sheds were full of
rice … when it was time to harvest, everyone helped out. If it was your turn, then all the
neighbors came and helped. The work was completed and you took your rice home.
When it was someone else’s turn, everyone helped again. If you needed rice, you’d go get
some from your shed and dry it.” Mr. Maarbach, born in 1921 and a lifelong resident of
Coronie, explains that during peak times in Coronie there were eight rice mills, ten
bakeries and 22 kotters (van der Veen 2010). Coronie also had its own ship builders.
Meanwhile, the Suriname economy at large struggled after the abolition in 1863 until the
middle 1900’s when bauxite became a critical factor during World War II (Price and
Price 1992).
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Towards Coronie’s De-Isolation and Suriname’s Independence

A series of environmental management decisions and development projects
resulted in social and environmental crises in Coronie. The biggest impact was the
construction of a road connecting the westerly district Nickerie, via Coronie, with
Paramaribo in the 1950’s. There were a number of other factors, political and economic,
which are often overlooked but also contributed indirectly to the current crisis. These
include the opening of new markets, ill-advised development projects, politics, and race
relations.
The global post-war political shifts had their impacts on local politics. The colony
had been an extremely important partner of the Allied Forces during the war by supplying
much needed bauxite for Aluminum production for war planes as well as a small number
of gunners and soldiers. The half-submerged German warship The Goslar, which was
sunk by American soldiers, lays in the middle of the Suriname River and serves as a
reminder today of the importance of Suriname during this time. Along with the booming
bauxite economy, several thousand American soldiers were stationed here to protect the
Dutch colony. Since wheat imports sometimes lagged, Coronie became the main
producer of bread from rice meal (called Warbread) for the Paramaribo market (van der
Veen et al, 2010). The close relationship between The Netherlands and the United States
existed since the Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) started mining for Bauxite
in the early 1900’s while Suriname was a Dutch colony and continued for many more
decades as a joint venture between ALCOA and Dutch mining giant Billiton, even after
Suriname’s independence. This relationship was surely also influenced by the American
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Monroe Doctrine which limited European influence in the Americas, including the
Caribbean.
Several factors negatively impacted the palm-based economy in Coronie. Van der
Veen et al (2010) mention that the trees had aged and were less productive after 1950,
while pests and palm tree diseases killed the weakest trees. Whether these pests arrived in
Coronie as a result of the increased exposure from “outsiders” due to the new road
remains unknown. These factors were not mentioned by any key informants. They did
mention the arrival of soya oil from the United Stated in local markets. Not only was the
oil much cheaper, the Coronie oil was also characterized as foul smelling in a marketing
campaign (key informant #16, October 3, 2009). Farmers from Coronie once again could
not compete with products produced in the US and coconut production was drastically
reduced. Unfortunately, pig farming is intricately linked to palm oil production by kopra,
and as a result it suffered the same fate. The new road also meant that people could
migrate to the capital city easier. Several informants mentioned that younger people
especially left in droves because they preferred a city life over the hard work of climbing
coconut trees to harvest nuts and grate them by hand. However, while the road gave them
a means to leave, the reason may well have been the collapse of the local economy for the
factors just mentioned.

Political Independence and Representation. Suriname’s prominence during
WWII created an awareness of self-determination in the colony, especially since Holland
itself was occupied by the Germans for much of the war period and the colony was
expected to govern itself. Globally, many colonies started demanding independence from
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European colonizers who could barely govern their own ravaged countries, let alone
distant colonies. Holland was a willing partner in Suriname’s path towards independence
and the first steps towards independence were agreed upon even before the war has
ended. In 1943, the Suriname Union was created with its goal of “ordering” Suriname
society based on justice and reform. The first political parties were created along race and
religious lines just after the war: Progressive Suriname People’s Party (PSV) which was
mostly creole and catholic, National Party of Suriname (NPS) which remains primarily
creole and protestant, Progressive Reform Party (VHP) had a predominant south Asian
membership, and the Javanese Kaum Tani Persatuan Indonesia (KTPI) party. With the
start of a political party system came local political representation. The collapse of the
social fabric of Coronie started with this process (van der Veen et al, 2010).

Development and Independence Aid. With support from the United States
initiated Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe, Suriname received its first
big development aid from Holland in 1948. The seven year Welvaartsfonds (Prosperity
Fund) was intended for economic development and human well-being in Suriname
(Schalkwijk, 2009). The most significant for Coronie were the development of three large
polders in Nickerie for rice production, the Institute for Mechanical Agriculture intended
to support the rice industry, and the National Planning Office. The fund was worth 40
million Dutch guilders (Nf), equal to about 28 million Surinamese guilders (Sf), but lost
about 25% of its value over time as the Nf was devalued. This fund was significant in that
it invested heavily in rice production in Coronie and Nickerie districts.
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With the loss of coconut productivity in Coronie, the Welvaartsfonds was used to
inject new life in the agricultural sector. A new 550 hectare coconut polder was built
along the coast, complete with a dike and pumping station. However, this period saw the
start of increased coastal erosion and the entire plantation was lost to the sea. The erosion
that started in the 1950’s was the same erosion that continues in Coronie today (see
chapter 4). For now it is sufficient to know that this investment, which could have made a
difference to the local economy, was irreplaceably lost. Whether local knowledge of the
dynamic coastline was not considered remains unknown.
The second development fund started in 1954 and was known as the Ten Year
Plan (TJP) in the amount of Sf128 million (of which 1/3 was a grant and the remainder a
loan or match). The TJP invested in many large scale engineering projects as well as
many social projects such as schools and hospitals. With the booming bauxite economy
and large influx of development aid, spirits were high and even the World Bank fully
expected that Suriname would be able to build a sustainable economy as well as
institutions and become largely independent from Holland (Schalkwijk 2009). New
polders were constructed in Nickerie and the tropical rice research institute, called
Wageningen, was funded to become a leading developer of desirable rice varieties in the
world. The road from Paramaribo to Coronie was completed and paved in the 1960’s and
was further connected to its easterly and westerly neighbors and currently carries the
name: the Oost West Verbinding (East West Connection).
Increased investments in the rice sector were not isolated to Suriname but part of
the global Green Revolution. Research in mechanized food production to keep up with
population growth was the driving force behind this movement. Mechanized rice
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production, supported by funds from the TJP, transformed Coronie from a small
community where families harvested rice in small groups and maintained diversified
farms of fruit trees, pigs and chickens, to an unmistakable mechanized large scale
farming community. Informant #21, who told of the cooperative nature of small-scale
family farming, explained this transformation as follows:
“every front yard had a combine, all brand new machines. The Coroniaan
saw money like it was water, but they did not spend it wisely. There was
no training or education … things like accounting, and paying the banks
on time to avoid interest. The bank wants to have its money too.”

At the peak of the Green Revolution in Coronie, there were 200 farmers active.
Poor training and lack of knowledge of large scale farming resulted in low yields and
many farms failed. By the time the banks repossessed farming equipment, there were two
farmers active. These are still farming rice today. The same informant explained: “Only
two farmers used their brains. They are engineers, Mr. Hooplot and Tjon A Loi.” Coronie
even had a local branch of the Agricultural Bank (Landbouw Bank) but the only thing
that remains today is the 1.5 million euro debt (Feller, November 6, 2006).
While different actors in Suriname disagree about the exact reason for coastal
erosion, no one argues about the detrimental effects of the new Oost West Verbinding and
accompanying intensified agricultural practices on the local hydrology. Excessive water
from the massive Coronie swamp to the south of the Totness settlements used to drain via
a complex system of creeks and rivers to the Atlantic Ocean. If it was not for the many
shell ridges that run parallel to the coastline and which have been the basis for roads and
settlements in coastal Suriname, water would flow directly from the swamp to the ocean
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and it occasionally still does so after high precipitation events. Mr. Feller explained how
the swamp acts as a massive sponge and increases retention of freshwater during the
rainy season and slowly releases this through creeks and canals during the dry season
when much of the rest of the country is completely dry.
The historic system of polders ensured that each polder functioned as an island by
having a boundary of high earthen dams while letting the water from the Coronie swamp
or the Atlantic (during spring tides) flow easily between the systems. Sluice gates
allowed the planters to control freshwater to flow in when needed for irrigation or
excessive rainwater to flow out during low tides. The polder system was famously
perfected by the Dutch where a series of waterschappen (waterscapes) manage a system
of several thousand polders today. The effectiveness of the system of polders in Coronie
was officially recognized by the Dutch queen in 1917 (van der Veen et al., 2010).
The new Oost West Verbinding was built on one of the high shell ridges and
effectively cut off the flow of freshwater from the Coronie Swamp to the coast. Bridges
between the polders were replaced by culverts and sluice gates were placed in the canals.
More critically, the newly established mechanized rice farms, several hundred hectares
each, to the south of the Oost West Verbinding were ‘protected’ from the free flowing
swamp water by a waterkerende dam (water prevention dam). This drastically changed
the local hydrology and stressed the sensitive balance of the coastal ecosystem.
Additional waterkerende dammen were built after 1977. Finally, the newly introduced
agricultural techniques required high inputs of pesticides and herbicides. These toxins
were released into the coastal wetland systems. I could not locate any water quality data
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to verify the extent of pollution but local key informants as well as government officials
mentioned that this pollution played a role in the demise of mangroves along the coast.

Increased Dependence on Paramaribo. The district of Coronie was rapidly
transformed from a prosperous independent and economically thriving group of
settlements in the 1940s to an indebted and poorly ecologically engineered environment
with a seemingly shrinking social capital in the 1970s. Paramaribo started effectively
subsidizing Coronie with projects and a workforce that was increasingly employed by the
government. A high ranking government official in Coronie agreed that too many people
in the district are officially employed by the government. All but one respondent from
Coronie believed that government employment is used in the district for political gain
during election years. This is unique in Suriname because Coronie has a very small
population (partly resulting from the migration as described above) but a significantly
larger representation in parliament.
The historical division of votes among different districts changed over time. The
Staten van Suriname was the precursor of the current parliament starting in 1949. All 21
members were elected by the public. The governor was responsible for creating the
cabinet which was then responsible to the Staten van Suriname for governing the colony.
Elections were supposed to be held every four years but elections were held more
frequently in the early years mostly due to political maneuvering: 1949, 1951, 1955,
1958, 1963, 1967, 1969 and 1973. The number of members increased to 36 during the
1963 elections and again to 39 during the 1969 elections. Suriname obtained its
independence from Holland in 1975 and the Staten van Suriname was changed to De
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Nationale Assemblee (DNA). Votes are tallied by district so that each district has its own
representatives in DNA.
All key informants from Coronie complained of the fact that the government or at
least the parliamentary system is responsible for creating an environment of dependence
and indolence in Coronie. The district commissioner, who is the highest government
representative in the district, lamented: “I think that [the political system] played an
important role. During this time, election time, we receive stacks of letters from people
who want to be employed by the government so that the government will get their vote”.
Mr. Anton Paal, a local politician and current member of parliament, does not only blame
the political system: “not only politics is to blame for the division, but also the church.
They fight like cats and dogs, mice and rats” (van der Veen et al, 2010, p. 68). The
district commissioner explains: “After independence this really started. An attitude called
zeven even became prevalent in Coronie which is a local saying meant for government
employees who show up at 7 AM but only stay for a short period (“even”). Coronie thus
has a disproportionate number of people receiving an official salary from the government
who in fact do not have an office or “show up” for work. The irony is that most of these
people are employed by the Ministry of Public Works in the Department of
Environmental Management and could be put to work in local maintenance of canals and
management of sluice gates to ensure that freshwater continues to flow to the coast.
Corruption and manipulation of the political system are directly related to the
continuously shrinking population of Coronie. Records show that the number of adult
slaves who gained freedom in 1863 was 1,976, but nearly 150 years later the total
population of Coronie is no more than 3,000, with approximately 2000 voters. Since the
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distribution of votes in the rest of the country is biased favorably towards the districts,
politicians in Paramaribo (where more than 50% of the population lives but only 33% of
members are represented) engage in constant political maneuvering to gain extra seats in
the districts that have a disproportionately high number of representatives compared to
the population. Coronie, for example, currently has less than 1% of the total population of
Suriname but controls 2 seats of the 51 in parliament or about 4%. This also means that
parliamentary seats from Coronie require the fewest number of votes (fewer than 550 for
the first seat). With 27% of people unemployed and another 37% listed as “not
economically active” or “activity status unknown,” it becomes clear how tempting it is
for the ruling party or coalition to create additional government positions in a country
where over 40% of working people are employed by the government (ABS 2009).

Conclusions

Suriname’s colonial history and its strong political ties with The Netherlands have
placed an unmistakable mark on its development trajectory. The history of Totness from
post abolition of slavery in 1863 to the 1950’s was particular in that the more isolated this
community was, the better off people were. This is the period when Coronie acquired the
name Land of Milk and Honey. This is, of course, in relative terms considering that
Suriname’s economy generally suffered after the collapse of the slave-based economy.
Nevertheless, Coronie was considered prosperous, and more importantly, it was
independent so that local knowledge was well-developed and solutions were sought
locally for environmental problems. The exact nature of the system of social capital is not
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known but people in Coronie still practiced a form of cooperative farming in the 1940’s
and 50’s.
After the introduction of foreign cooking oils in the local market post WWII and
failure of local producers to compete, the coconut based economy in Coronie started to
falter. Others explained that disease and an aging coconut tree stand were also important
factors in low yield. Regardless, the coconut industry was integrated with the pork sector
and the latter also suffered greatly. Notwithstanding constant social change, it is not clear
from this narrative why the local population did not manage to overcome these
challenges given the numerous other challenges that were overcome during the previous
century. An economic analysis of events is necessary to better understand the cascading
effects that led to economic distress in the district.
A juxtaposition of these events with national development policies gives us more
insight into what happened between the 1960’s and now when Totness is facing severe
coastal erosion and SLR. The Welvaartfonds made an unwise investment when it
established a 550 ha coconut polder close to the coast in order to inject new life into the
local economy. The timing and location could not have been more unfortunate as the
process of coastal erosion started soon after and the entire polder was lost to sea.
Subsequent investments in rice cultivation led to the loss of local knowledge of small
scale diversified livelihoods and enormous debts with the banks. Meanwhile, Coronie
became a politically strategic battleground given its high ratio of members in parliament
over the voting population and policies were implemented that continue today which
have created an attitude of willing dependence on the state and general indolence in the
community which is difficult to overcome. These factors are detrimental for autonomous
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community based adaptation and similarly do not encourage participation in decision
making of adaptation policies. Chapter 5 takes a closer look at how the seawall in Totness
was decided and what the implications are for further adaptations in the future.
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CHAPTER FIVE
COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES ON COASTAL MANAGEMENT

“Community-based adaptation aims to empower local people to cope with and
plan for the impacts of climate change. In a world where knowledge equals
power, you could be forgiven for thinking that enabling this type of adaptation
boils down to providing local people with information. Conventional approaches
to planning adaptation rely on ‘expert’ advice and credible ‘science’ from
authoritative information providers such as the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change. But to truly support the needs of local communities, this
information needs to be more site-specific, more user-friendly and more inclusive
of traditional knowledge and existing coping practices.”
Saleemul Huq. IIED, October 2011, http://pubs.iied.org/17103IIED

Introduction

Much of climate change adaptation takes place at the community level.
Adaptations that are initiated by the state, such as specific policies or implementations of
new technologies, are all carried out and enforced at the community and household level.
The state does not always endorse greater community autonomy that is required for
community based adaptation (CBA), however, and herein lies a contradiction. Over time,
the state may have effectively created a discourse of power and control over resources
such that communities also expect, and trust, the state to provide solutions, while they do
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not undertake local adaptation action. Perceptions of climate change impacts are also
important factors in people’s decision to start adaptations (Leiserowitz 2006; Leiserowitz
et al. 2006) but it is not well known how people’s perceptions and expectations of the
state determine their actions in terms of climate adaptation.
Literature on CBA mostly concerns isolated communities that have historically
operated outside official state control such as indigenous groups. These groups are
expected to practice autonomous adaptation which takes place without state involvement
or coercion. Autonomous community based adaptation therefore occurs outside state
developed adaptation plans which usually lack inclusion of important local knowledges.
Huq’s quote above explains how the state may ignore local knowledge when developing
adaptation options. This disconnect is carried forward from the national to the
international stage where meetings tend to ignore local CBA processes and focus on
larger geopolitical negotiations between states. Pelling (2011) argues the following:
“[t]here is also the possibility that the climate change community – which
has its eyes tightly focused on the IPCC process, and which in turn is a
product of negotiated content between science and governments – has not
found analysis of power as part of adaptation to be a priority” (p37-38).

If communities depend on the state for their security from climate extremes by
means of a social contract, can the state provide adaptation solutions as effective as local
autonomous adaptations? In chapter 4, I showed how greater reliance on the state has
eroded local adaptive capacity in Totness and increased the community’s vulnerability.
Kuhlicke and Kruse (2009, referenced in Pelling 2011) have similarly shown how the
state actually increased local vulnerability when a community relied on state support to
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reduce flood risk. Social contracts, therefore, require further analysis in order to
understand how adaptation can work optimally, and much can be learned from state
policies and existing governance institutions.
Social contract theory is important for understanding how risk is negotiated in
society and what the expectations are among community members and policy makers in
terms of adaptation. Social contract theory is almost as old as philosophy itself (Johnston
et al., 2000) and was much discussed by the likes of Hobbes and Locke in Western
Europe. The theory is based on a set of believes that citizens in a society give up certain
freedoms in exchange for a number of securities provided by the state. This early
foundation of political societies was a departure from early societies where the dominant
powerful actors assumed their right to govern, to newer ones where this power was
voluntarily given up by the people through consensus. Social contract theory has received
much interest in the last few decades, particularly from those interested in social justice
(see for example John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and Amartya Sen’s The Idea of
Justice). Further linkages have been made between social contract theory and theories of
environmental justice and even political ecology (Johnston, 2000). Earlier work on social
contract was critiqued by feminist scholars and Marxists geographers for its lack of
gender and its absence of class conflict respectively. Despite these concerns, there is
renewed interest in the climate change adaptation literature to investigate social contracts
in adaptation (Pelling, 2011). This interest seeks to better understand how autonomous
and planned adaptation is to take place given a set of institutions and expectations
between local communities and the state.
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Other local-state relationships have been found to be problematic. In his critique
of high-modernism, James C. Scott (1999) takes a look at different state interventions
that have attempted to make their populace more “legible” by stripping it of local nuance
and perceived disorder. These methods were used by different states, sometimes by force,
in order to build a well-organized ‘database’ of their resources, both natural and human,
and to optimize planning, control and power.
Scott’s introduction starts with an analysis of a modern forestry management
which strips the natural forest of all its above and below ground complexity, and replaces
it with a mono-crop that can be managed and controlled through perfect timing of its
growth cycles. The immediate increased efficiency almost always turns out to be a
weakening of the crop’s resilience to future environmental variations and pests. Holling
and Meffe (1995) have shown how this “command-and-control pathology of natural
resource management” leads to ecological crises. Meanwhile, Scott has shown how this
pathology can have disastrous consequences when applied to social groups, not the least
of which involve a loss of local knowledge.
Scott (1999) also found that local knowledge appeared to erode with increasing
state involvement. As I have shown in the previous chapter, several factors including new
infrastructure coupled with migration of young people, technological innovation in
agriculture, and an increased dependence on state and development aid have also reduced
local knowledge in Totness, Coronie. Local knowledge of coping strategies appears to be
lost (or could be present but only within a marginalized and powerless segment of the
population) and this is exactly the type of knowledges believed to be necessary for
successful adaptation. In situations where state interventions seek to control their human
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resources and when the state does not embrace local management (based on local
knowledge), what is to be expected of locally-informed climate change adaptation?
Moreover, if a social contract that lack local control is accepted by a community, how
does this impact its ability to adapt to climate change?
This chapter takes a closer look at how local perceptions, and therefore local
expectations, are formed. These expectations are closely connected to local knowledges
of coastal processes and perceived needs for management. I examined what happened
when local perceptions were unmet and how the local / state relationship was negotiated.
This again could be important for understanding how adaptation could occur. I further
examined these questions by analyzing coastal management processes in Suriname and
taking a closer look at the importance, and limits, of local knowledge when developing
optimal adaptation policies.

Overview of Coastal Management in Suriname

Four nature reserves were established in the coastal and estuarine zone between
1961 and 1972 while Suriname was still under Dutch rule. These reserves eventually led
to the establishment of four coastal management areas called Multi-Use Management
Areas (MUMAs) which covered a much greater area than the original reserves. Aside
from a small area north of Paramaribo, the entire coastline falls under a MUMA. The
North Coronie MUMA was created in 1987, and Totness is also located within this
MUMA. Weg Naar Zee, which lies northwest of Paramaribo, is not located in a MUMA.
The definition of a MUMA is an "area where integrated management by or on behalf of
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the Government is needed for a rational use of its natural resources" (Teunissen 2003).
The key words in this definition are “integrated management.” What does the state mean
by these words and what forms of knowledge are to be used in this form of management?
The first MUMA was created by the Minister of Natural Resources in 1987, and
the head of the Suriname Forest Service (LBB) was appointed to be responsible for the
MUMA. The remaining three MUMAs were established shortly after. LBB has since
moved to the Ministry of Spatial Planning, Land and Forest Management (RGB) which
was created after the 2006 elections. The ability to create new government controlled
management areas stems from a decree that was introduced shortly after military rule was
established in 1980. A decree had to be used because the Planning Act of 1973, which
actually provides legal room for establishing “Special Management Areas,” was never
made operational by parliament (Teunissen 2003). Decree L-2 was thus created in 1982
on the issuance of state property lands (S.B. 1982 no. 11) and it is the same decree that
allowed for redistribution of land to landless farmers at Weg Naar Zee in the early
1980’s.
There is not much information available about actual management activities of the
coastal zone and MUMAs, because the Nature Conservation Commission, the arm of
LBB at the ministry of RGB, is under-staffed and lacks resources and capacity so that
coastal management areas largely remain paper parks (Haskoning, 2006). Nevertheless,
some assumptions can be made from plans and projects that have been developed and
executed over the years. Suriname ratified the United Nations Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) in 1997 which means that it has committed itself to the Convention’s
guidelines that include clear instructions for co-management and stakeholder
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participation. More importantly, the government has shown increasing interest in
Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) during the last two decades. In fact, ICZM
was specifically promoted in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) as an adaptation
strategy for low lying coastal zones to the impacts of climate change and sea level rise
(IPCC, 2007). The report states that “ICZM is widely recognized and promoted as the
most appropriate process to deal with climate change, sea-level rise, and other current
and long-term coastal challenges …” (p. 340).
Policy makers in Suriname followed the regional trend and started to develop
ICZM plans in the late 1990s with funding from the Inter-American Development Bank
(IaDB). The Dutch firm Royal Haskoning led the first IaDB funded project with the
objective to assess the legal and institutional limitations for undertaking ICZM in
Suriname, formulate the Terms of Reference (ToR) to prepare an ICZM master plan, and
propose selected pilot projects which will assist the government in gaining experience in
ICZM (Opdam et al. 2006). A subsequent IaDB project was started to develop an actual
ICZM plan, propose legal and institutional reforms to implement the plan, and implement
a pilot project at Weg Naar Zee. Funding for each component was approximately
US$359,000, US$75,000, and US$136,000 respectively, and the project implementation
was led by a different Dutch firm called Deltares (www.iadb.org, last accessed February
26, 2012). Before I take a closer look at issues of local and scientific knowledge and
power conflict within ICZM, I will explore what actually requires management in coastal
Suriname.
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Integrated Coastal Zone Management. ICZM became more mainstream after
“integrated coastal management” was highlighted in Agenda 21 of the Earth’s Summit in
1992 (Cicin-Sain, 1993). The ICZM approach attempts to be more participatory at all
levels of management. The integration part of the title refers to an integration of different
sectors such as fishing, tourism, shipping or conservation, and different government
departments in charge of coastal resource management. In Suriname, these could be the
ministries dealing with agriculture, fisheries, infrastructure, planning and natural
resources. There is also an expectation of integration over time, encompassing
sustainability issues, and space, which means both distant and nearby marine and
terrestrial activities. ICZM is also supposed to encourage debate and participation among
the public, private and civil society. In all aspects, it seems that ICZM may provide a
good framework to tackle some of the challenges of climate change adaptation.
While ICZM is an ambitious undertaking, it need not be impossible. The first step
of ICZM is to identify areas of conflict between different interest groups. Large parts of
the Suriname coast are uninhabited or used sustainably by relatively small populations,
and therefore do not require integrated coastal management. Coastal management is not
necessary where human activities have a low impact and are sustainable. Only in areas
where multiple groups depend on coastal resources, i.e. tourism, fishing, aquaculture, or
wind farms, is it more likely that one group’s activities impact another group’s interests
or well-being. These activities may take place at different temporal and spatial scale, i.e.
current activities that have impacts at a later point in time, or activities upstream that
affect people downstream. In such cases, it is necessary to evaluate the tradeoffs and find
scenarios that are somehow optimized, either by least impacts on the environment,
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climate change resilience, profit, or cultural acceptability. These are examples of cases
where ICZM could provide the necessary framework for evaluating possible scenarios
with maximum benefit for all parties involved.
The ICZM project in Suriname was set up with oversight from an inter-ministerial
group of local experts who monitored the work of the Dutch consultant, Deltares. The
group met on a regular basis to determine the consultant’s deliverables and monitor the
progress. I interviewed 10 of the 12 members of the inter-ministerial group, most of
whom had technical backgrounds in fisheries, agriculture, forestry or law. These
interviews allowed me to draw conclusions about the process of how ICZM was
implemented, particularly focusing on participation and inclusion of local knowledge.
Confidentiality was ensured to protect these government employees’ particular positions.

Linking Coastal Management with State and Local Perspectives

As Huq’s opening quote explained, adaptation at the local level requires an
empowerment of people at the community level. There are two parties involved in this
process: the state and community based groups. The following sections explore what
perspectives are held by these two groups. Research on this topic also led to a better
understanding of what types of local knowledge and existing coping mechanisms should
be included as suggested above.

Perspectives of the State. All ten government experts that were interviewed saw
problems with the way the ICZM project was conceived and how an eventual ICZM plan
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would be implemented. Problems arose almost immediately and were focused on
boundary issues where an ICZM agency would have jurisdiction. As one senior
government official put it “[the consultants] want to set the boundary 50 kilometers from
the coast inland and 12 miles out in sea. And they want to manage everything in between.
That means that they want to become the government of Suriname.” This was clearly
unacceptable to the state but also quite impractical from a management standpoint. There
was also a basic misunderstanding on the part of government experts of how ICZM is
supposed to work in practice. Many volunteered that they would be willing to answer
questions but that their expertise was not on the subject. Follow-up questions about
whether people took it upon themselves to read up on the concepts, distribute
publications on ICZM or purchase books were answered with skepticism. The Dutch
consulting firm did not make an attempt either to provide additional information which
may make sense from a business point of view: it is in a consultant’s best interest not to
educate the people who are responsible for monitoring and evaluating the consultant’s
work and progress. Finally, two experts in the group said that they continued to
participate in meetings despite their disbelief in the process only because they received
monetary compensation for attending meetings. This is an important admission by these
experts and points to the ineffectiveness of this inter-ministerial group and how decision
making, and ultimately adaptation outcomes, can fail.
Another point of contention was the overlap between an ICZM plan and the
existing MUMAs. Government representatives who were employed at the Ministry of
RGB and responsible for management of the MUMAs were adamant that whatever ICZM
plan was conceived would not receive a higher legal status as the existing MUMAs. This
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is a major point of contention given that the MUMAs cover more than 90% of the coast.
These representatives expressed frustration that management plans already existed for the
MUMAs but were not implemented as a result of lacking resources, while the Ministry of
PLOS managed to receive much-needed funds from the IaDB to develop new coastal
zone management plans. They also expressed fear that a new ICZM entity, perhaps a new
agency, would fall outside the control of the Ministry of RGB. While the state does not
want to lose control over state resources, competition also prevails among departments in
different ministries. This has enormous implications for climate change adaptations that
require integrated management over resources. As I have shown in the previous chapter
with water management in Coronie, a task that requires multi-ministerial cooperation, an
integrated approach to management is inefficient as a result of inter-ministerial and interdepartmental competition.

Local Perspectives in Coronie. The Committee for the Rehabilitation of the
Northern Coronie Polder has resorted to using the media to voice their concern over
environmental problems. The Committee is composed largely of elders living near
Totness and their main “spokesperson” is Mr. Alex Feller who also chairs the committee.
Between December 2003 and July 2008, Feller sent six critical opinion pieces to De
Ware Tijd (DWT), which is a widely distributed morning newspaper. The articles had
titles such as Coronie’s Coastal Problems Cannot be Solved? (March 15, 2006), Poor
Coastal Management in Coronie at Critical Crossroads (November 6, 2006), and
Mechanical Rice Farming Curse for Coronie (February 5, 2007). The expectations of this
group were clearly stated: they demanded better management of freshwater resources in
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the district by the responsible ministries, and a correction of past mistakes that were made
which they felt were the primary cause of coastal erosion today. Feller, who is a selfproclaimed amateur historian, gave a clear overview of the sequence of events that have
led to the current problems in the district.
Feller’s opinion pieces set up a dualism between local knowledge informed by
elders in the community who continue the tradition of storytelling, and the government
experts who have obtained university titles at local and foreign universities. Feller’s
knowledge is based on anecdotal evidence with a high level of detail of historical events.
For example, he referred to 1855 when the coast had eroded to a similar point as it has
now and how actions by locals, specifically the clearing of channels to allow freshwater
to freely flow to the coast, led to 4 kilometers of coastal accretion in 65 years. His articles
are very critical of the amount of money that has been “wasted” over the last half century
in projects that have only made the district’s people more vulnerable.
Feller’s committee does not have full support of local residents, however.
According to Feller, most people in the community trust that the state, with its centralized
control, will provide solutions to local problems. Moreover, Feller’s critique is not trusted
or appreciated by those who do not wish to change the status quo because they receive
government handouts. Feller’s committee, as well as the farmers group at Weg Naar Zee,
therefore do not always receive majority support from local communities. This may be
exacerbated by the fact that a disproportionately high number of people in Coronie are
employed by the state who Feller is in fact criticizing.
Feller’s articles are also critical of the state’s plans to build a seawall. This
critique led to further conflict, and eventually a public display knowledge and power.
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Feller’s argument is that the erosion process can be reversed by improving water
management, and by allowing freshwater to flow from the Coronie Swamp back to the
coast. This movement of water was stopped or inhibited by several dykes, and by a lack
of maintenance of local channels. The committee’s campaign slogan was called “Let the
Waters Flow” and their goal was clearly stated in a report: “Coronie is seeking partners to
assist and carry out a lobby campaign to find donors such as the Dutch government and
European Union and convince them that “local solutions” are the only ones that will
create the conditions for sustainable well-being in Coronie” (Coronie: Let the Waters
Flow: Partnership for Development, pamphlet, 2004). The state’s plans for building a
seawall were therefore openly and repeatedly challenged, and the state in turn relied on a
team of paid consultants to challenge Feller’s knowledge. The consultants, who were
Surinamese and Dutch nationals, claimed that Feller does not understand the importance
of mudbanks, not freshwater, in the process of coastal erosion and accretion. Based on his
newspaper critiques, this claim could be supported because the first time Feller
mentioned “mudbanks” as part of the process was in the last publication on July 2008.
During my interview with him, however, he showed a clear understanding of the role of
mudbanks.
When I asked Mr. Feller about coastal processes, he gave a detailed explanation
of the role of mudbanks in growth and survival of mangroves. He also explained that the
flow of freshwater to the mangroves was critical for the mangroves and that this factor
had been consistently neglected by scientists who only focus on the role of mudbanks.
Feller explained that there are two processes that determine mangrove growth: active and
passive growth. These concepts were Feller’s own but I do not know to what extend they

101

are part of the local discourse. Feller explained that active growth occurs when a
mangrove is present and small plants are protected from wave energy. He explained that
passive growth is an equally important process. Passive growth occurs when the large
volume of freshwater that enters the open ocean has a “calming” effect therefore
indirectly protecting mangroves from waves. Freshwater has a lower density than
saltwater, and the flow of freshwater into the ocean causes the waters to stratify with
freshwater sitting on top of saltwater. According to Feller, this creates a calming effect
immediately offshore from Totness. Coronie elders refer to this process as: The Meeting
(or dialogue) of the Waters. Freshwater flow then is not simply important for creating
brackish conditions for mangrove growth, especially given the high salinity tolerance of
black mangroves (Hogarth, 2007), but it provides a similar function as mudbanks:
protection from waves.
Feller’s assertions were seen as a challenge to scientific explanation, and tension
between these different knowledge claims came to a climax during a stakeholder meeting
organized by the state to inform the local population about the seawall. In an effort to
discredit Feller’s knowledge, one consultant performed a “scientific” experiment with
beakers of fresh and salt water to show proof of how fluid mud floats in saltwater,
creating the mudbanks, but sinks in freshwater and could therefore not provide any
protection for mangroves. This explanation does not disprove Feller’s knowledge, nor
necessarily supports scientific explanation of coastal processes, but its appearance was
scientific enough to create doubts in Feller’s explanation with the local community.
While this was set up as a display of knowledge, it was in fact an expression of power
because the experiment was done to impress those in attendance of the superior nature of
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scientific experimentation, the positivist foundation of science, and the absolute necessity
therefore to build a seawall. Feller’s support among the local population, he claims,
subsequently waned and construction of the seawall started shortly after this stakeholder
meeting.

Local Perspectives in Weg Naar Zee. Historical state interventions may be good
indicators of what local residents can expect from future state involvement in finding
solutions for coastal erosion. Through semi-structured interviews, I solicited information
from local respondents about their past experiences and future expectations of state
involvement. Local respondents mostly arrived at WNZ in two waves, a small group of
early pioneers arrived between the 1960’s and 70’s. They endured much hardship as the
area was a true mosquito invested swamp. During these years, large land titles started to
be handed out, especially for areas that were located on the shell ridges and were suitable
for agriculture. Immediately after the military coup in 1980, land reform allowed many
new people to settle in the area and receive title on land that had not been put in
production. These early settlers were poor farmers but have accumulated considerable
wealth over time and are now part of a very important vegetable and flower industry for
the local and export market. They have in depth knowledge of land use change and have
a keen awareness of the political history of the place. The questions that I asked were
framed so that I could gather information on whether people were inclined to solve the
problems by themselves or expected the state to take the lead.
Respondent overwhelmingly said that the state was responsible for solving local
environmental problems. This expectation was not based on good experiences they had
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with the state, however, but it was rather based on a sense of hopelessness. All 22
respondents at Weg Naar Zee said that only the state could help with the problem of
coastal erosion and several added that the state should ask for foreign assistance. As one
person said “the Dutch are living below sea level. They are the best dike builders and
they can help us.” Another respondent felt that since developed and industrialized
countries were responsible for climate change, they should help pay for a seawall. The
same respondent added that the state should bargain internationally with its forest: if
“they” did not give the money than the forest would be cut down. Such viewpoints are
not uncommon in Suriname unfortunately as I learned during meetings with government
officials (in my capacity as an employee with a biodiversity conservation organization) to
discuss possible carbon market funding mechanisms that require a reduction in
deforestation. Local respondents generally felt that the problem was too big to handle by
themselves. The coastline was eroding much faster than they had anticipated and they felt
that no amount of community action would solve the problem.
I also asked respondents if they felt that they could trust the state based on past
experiences. Two projects that the state had executed at WNZ were used as examples by
several residents, often with much discontent. After a high water event four years earlier,
local residents convinced the responsible minister of Public Works that a dike had to be
built. This was done using clay, strengthened by logs, and reinforced with a strong textile
that was inserted on the seaward side of the logs (see Figure 1.2). All respondents who
mentioned this project complained of the fact that the contractor got the job because he
was politically connected, and that he did not complete the entire length of the dam that
was agreed to. The clay dam is currently showing that its design is insufficient and locals
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are reinforcing it with additional logs where the dam is breached. Respondents have
expressed surprise at the speed with which the water had eroded the coastline and the
effectiveness with which it was destroying the clay dam. The dam was supposed to be a
temporary structure until a bigger stronger seawall would be constructed but this has not
happened as of this writing.
The second project that received much scorn was a new pump station. The station
was located in a place so that when it is pumping excessive water from agricultural fields
south of the study area, it does not drain excess water to the sea. The canals that receive
the flood waters are not big enough to handle the flow from the large pump station so that
properties to the north of the station are flooded. Regardless of these state interventions,
residents remain hopeful that the state will find a solution to the current erosion. This
trust does not appear to be based on positive hope in the state’s ability but rather on
hopelessness that an alternative exists. For example, after I asked a resident (#102) if
local people also took initiative to manage water or if they prefer to wait for the state to
help, his reply was
“Yes. The drainage here people did themselves, they dug it by hand, so
that the water could drain. But now, people don’t want to do this anymore,
they think that the government should do it. And now, that pumping
station, [the government] put it in the wrong place. When they pump,
everything here gets flooded. That didn’t used to happen. If there was no
pumping station than my land would stay dry.”

One would expect that after multiple failed projects by the state, locals would
prefer to take control of the situation or demand a higher degree of involvement and
transparency in state implemented projects. But this may not be possible because options
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for local people have been constructed for them through a discourse, a new reality, that
the state is in charge of management of local resources, including water management.
This same reality is also in Coronie where people have come to rely on the combined
services of multiple ministries to manage sluice gates and maintain drainage canals, but
when this does not perform these responsibilities, local residents do not take it upon
themselves to manage this critical infrastructure. It is also possible that since the state has
intervened in the past when the problem has reached a crisis level, and actually
implemented projects such as paved roads, power and water, that residents now have
faith that help will arrive when the issue becomes critical.
There is a strong sentiment among respondents at WNZ and government officials
that seawalls are the solution for future sea level rise and erosion. Several respondents
mentioned the seawall in Nickerie, the westerly most district of Suriname, as an example
of how this can work. The Nickerie seawall, however, was built in the mouth of the
Nickerie River where mudbanks have no effect and different geomorphic processes
dominate the shoreline. This detail needs to be clarified to those that use this seawall as
an example of proper adaptation to coastal erosion so that there is no confusion between
these two locations and adaptations. Respondents also referred to the Coronie seawall as
an example even though the cost and social outcome of this seawall remain questionable.
No respondent expressed any doubt over the required technical expertise or necessary
financing. This could be a result of the apparent ease which with the $70 million for the
Coronie seawall was made available. Such expectations are quite unrealistic.
Expectations of easily available funds for climate adaptation could become problematic.
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While the overwhelming response was that the state will provide solutions to
environmental crises, several respondents felt strongly that local residents should be
included, especially considering the errors that have been made in the past. As one
respondent said, “I think that the government should cooperate with community
organizations or local residents because [the residents] know what problems they are
dealing with. Perhaps the government does something that is not relevant for this area
and then it’s no use. It must be done together with the locals, I think.” Similar calls for
transparency were repeated by others. This was partly as a result of stakeholder meetings
that were held by the State Oil company, Staatsolie, when it conducted work at WNZ in
recent years. Residents who had never before experienced stakeholder meetings where
participation was encouraged, fondly remembered the meetings and have started
expecting similar procedures by the state. As one respondent explained: “[Staatsolie was]
doing something in the area a few years ago and we were told of everything they were
doing. This neighborhood does not get included by the government.” I believe that these
demands and expectations are fairly new in the community of WNZ and other
communities in the country as companies like Staatsolie, who try to abide by
international standards, introduce concepts such as social and environmental impact
assessments and stakeholder meetings. These developments have interesting implications
for the rapid pace with which environmental change will continue to happen and by
which the government will be required to respond.
Stakeholder meetings and participation, however, are still relatively new concepts
in Suriname and not always practiced as they are intended. When I first arrived in
Suriname, for example, I was invited by a family friend to accompany him to a
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stakeholder meeting that was being organized by the state telecommunication company,
Telesur, in Totness. Since I was planning to do my research in Totness, I took this
opportunity to familiarize myself with the area. To my surprise, the stakeholder meeting
was set up more like a public relations campaign for Telesur. Free food and drinks,
including alcohol, was provided for all participants, while the local government official
was showered with expensive gifts under much fanfare, and banners of the company were
hanging on all walls of the local meeting space. At the end of the meeting, which was
held to discuss a new sea cable that was entering the shoreline near Totness, one
participants got up so thank Telesur for all they had done for the community, and
expressed intent to always use Telesur’s services and not that of its competitors.
Regarding the ICZM pilot project that was supposed to take place at WNZ, I
asked respondents whether they had heard of “Integrated Coastal Zone Management.”
Not a single respondent answered positively, even though this area was supposed to be a
Deltares pilot site and awareness raising was a component of the project as well. Two
respondents thought that ICZM involved the construction of a new seawall of several
hundred kilometers from Paramaribo to the Saramakka River. I was not able to verify
from the Inter-American Development Bank why the pilot project and awareness
campaigns were not completed and whether the consultant had indeed received payment
for this task.
Similar to the community organization in Coronie, WNZ has a group of local
residents who have formed the Organization for the Interests of Farmers at Weg Naar Zee
(Belangenvereniging Landbouwers Weg Naar Zee). Like Mr. Feller in Coronie, the
public voice of this organization is Mr. Baynath, who is also the pandit of the local Hindu
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temple and manager of a Hindu spiritual and religious site. While Mr. Feller sent his
letters to the newspaper, Mr. Baynath sent letters directly to the Minister of Public
Works, and periodically invited the news media to the area when high tide events were
predicted to occur so that they could witness the physical evidence of waves crashing
over the mud wall. The fact that the farmers’ organization was created solely for political
purposes to increase pressure on the state for a solution to the erosion problem was not
lost on local residents. As one respondent (#108) put it “… but it is a political
organization. It is useless, they are interested in personal benefit … When they started the
organization, not a single farmer knew about it.” This respondent thus claims that the
pandit, who is not a farmer but the chair of the organization, purposely selected a name
that would get the attention from policy makers because WNZ is an important farming
region. Another respondent (#101) makes a similar remark: “the chairman of the farmers’
association is not himself a farmer.” This respondent also recognizes that the farmers’
association is not about farming at all but about coastal erosion that affects everyone at
WNZ, farmers and non-farmers alike.
Aside from the pandit, I only found one farmer in my sample who said that he
was a member of the organization. While people perceived it as too politically charged,
they still applauded the work that the organization was doing in bringing attention to
local problems. It is unfortunate then that these are the methods that people have to use to
get the state’s attention. The important aspect of local activism at WNZ was that people
did not simply ask for state intervention but they also expected to give input and
participate in the decision-making process as a result of recent changes. Previous
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stakeholder meetings for different projects raised the expectations of people to be
informed, included and consulted.

Importance and Limits of Local Knowledge

The complexity of climate change which includes global biochemical processes,
changes in ocean currents, and large scale ecological processes begs the question whether
local knowledge can be sufficient in finding adaptation solutions. There are some clear
shortcomings of local knowledge compared to scientific knowledge but the opposite is
also true. The challenge will be to find solutions that are based on a balance of local and
scientific knowledge. This is not about finding one single optimal solution but rather
about finding multiple combinations of local and scientific knowledge in an adaptive
management approach, one that recognized that we are dealing with highly dynamic
processes rather than steady-state systems. In this section, I discuss some of the
limitations and benefits of local knowledge in finding adaptation solutions.
The main limitation of local knowledge in the context of coastal processes is that
some processes occur on relatively long temporal and spatial scales so that multiple
generations need to have experienced these processes in order to have learned and
recognized them. In the case of coastal Suriname, mudbank cycles are approximately 25
to 30 years. This research showed a clear distinction between knowledge of coastal
mudbanks by resident in Coronie, whose ancestors have settled in the area since the
1850’s, and knowledge of the same processes at Weg Naar Zee where people have settled
only two generations ago. From the timing of the start of erosion at Weg Naar Zee, we
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can conclude that people must have settled in the region just as one mudbank had
“arrived” and the coastline started growing. The tail end of this mudbank started moving
westward in early 1980’s when erosion started to occur. When asked what the reason was
for the rapid erosion at Weg Naar Zee, only 2 out of 22 respondents referred to mudbanks
and most people mentioned climate change and sea level rise as the primary reason. The
lack of knowledge of the cyclical nature of erosion and accretion can most likely be
attributed to the relatively large time and space scales of the ecological processes. Local
knowledge then has limitations with respect to ecological processes of large temporal and
spatial scales.
Local knowledge may become especially important in expanding existing coping
strategies to find new adaptation options. Coping strategies are understood as the
temporary solutions that are used to cope with extreme crises or unexpected surprise
(Perramond, 2007). They are different from adaptation which is a long term change while
coping is a short term strategy which usually cannot be maintained indefinitely. Several
respondents at Weg Naar Zee, for example, explained different coping mechanism they
use during high water events and salinization of agricultural plots. Temporary sand
barriers can prevent the water from reaching valuable crops and flushing with freshwater
immediately after the water recedes can save some crops. Coping mechanisms can be
used in developing longer term adaptation strategies and people’s participation is
therefore critical.
The distinction that I make here between local and scientific knowledge is partly
produced. Some have even argued that there is no distinction between local ecological
knowledge and scientific knowledge (Agrawal 1995). People who rely on local
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knowledge for daily activities may also check the weather channel or rely on a mobile
phone to obtain market prices. As Scott (1999) points out, however, local knowledge is
not static and reliance on other more scientifically-based information does not diminish
it. The native American hunter in the forest in Suriname may use a German made shotgun
and a Finnish cellphone but that does not mean that he can no longer “read” the signs of
ecological processes and follow tracks when he goes hunting. It does not mean that his
knowledge has somehow become un-local or less local. For cost-effective and sustainable
adaptation outcomes, we must seek solutions that are informed by both local and
scientific knowledge, a combined knowledge.

Importance and Limits of Scientific Knowledge

In the context of Suriname, some clear limitations of scientific knowledge also
arose in discussions with policy makers and other government employees. Two examples
are the limited access of scientific journals and the lack of capacity to interpret and use
these studies for local policy making. There has been a long debate about who scientists,
and certainly political ecologists (Walker, 2007), are writing for, and whether science is
supposed to be “useful.” From the limited references of secondary data sources available
in Suriname, it can be concluded that peer-reviewed papers are not read by most local
consultants who write these documents, or for some other reason the authors decide not
to include them. Aside from the high cost of access to many scientific journals, there is
also a high cost associated with gathering data, especially aerial data that may be useful
in large scale monitoring of coastal processes. There is an additional lack of capacity to
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process such data. The (informal) spatial planning community in Suriname is small, and
as a member I know that there are very few people with remote sensing skills or general
knowledge of satellite data, including how to purchase, download, process and analyze it.
Such remote sensing capacity is desperately needed to make scientific knowledge useful
in Suriname.
There are other limitations to scientific or positivist science that are the subject of
many Science and Technology Studies. Lahsen (2009), for example, showed how
politicized subjects, such as whether the Amazon is a carbon source or sink, cannot be
resolved among different scientific teams who work with the most advanced technologies
but are nevertheless situated within certain political camps that stand to benefit or lose as
a result of the research results. In Suriname, I found that the bias against social science
studies and the faith in the positivist “hard sciences” was present among farmers as well
as policy makers. This may be exacerbated given the hegemonic focus on development
where development is understood to mean large engineering projects with enormous
price tags and using the latest advancements in technology. This was also evident in the
fixation on engineering solutions to sea level rise by local residents. It was therefore
interesting that local knowledge of ecological processes made the Coronie group prefer
so-called “green” solutions to the erosion problem. In Coronie, however, residents had
gained a knowledge base over time and understood the cyclical nature of coastal
processes, even recalling solutions that were implemented many generations earlier.
While scientific knowledge has its limitations, its value in understanding the
impacts of climate change is undeniable, not the least because scientific models can be
used to simulate ranges of future climate conditions that lie outside the known or
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modeled historical record. In the case of coastal processes in Suriname, scientific tools
have been irreplaceable for monitoring of mudbank movements along the northeast coast
of South America with satellites, regional hydrological processes such as rainfall, wind
direction, and long term sea level oscillations.

Conclusions

This chapter focused on local and state perspectives of coastal management. Local
perspectives were gathered from interviews with respondents at Weg Naar Zee and key
informants in Totness, while state perspectives were gathered from an inter-ministerial
group of experts on Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM). The fact that the
government was implementing an ICZM project meant that it was considering greater
integration of local knowledge and better participatory processes in coastal management.
The ICZM project had many problems however. Most government experts felt that it was
designed to fail, and some even confided in me that they only continued to participate in
discussions for the monetary compensation for attending meetings. Meanwhile, coastal
residents living at the site where a $136,000 pilot project, including an awareness
campaign, was supposed to take place, had never heard of ICZM.
In both Totness and Weg Naar Zee there are activist groups that are pushing the
state for immediate action, as well as residents who trust that the state will come to the
rescue. The track record of state intervention is not great, however. Chapter 3 focused on
large scale development projects that failed in Totness and here I have shown how
smaller state interventions at Weg Naar Zee had many negative results. One positive sign
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at Weg Naar Zee was the expectation of residents to be more closely involved in decision
making processes. This is, however, the result of others who have introduced
participatory processes and not a state-sponsored initiative.
Local communities continue to struggle with powerful political interests. The
activist groups, represented by Feller in Coronie and the pandit at WNZ, were effectively
marginalized and their only means of action appeared to be writing letters to state
representatives and to national newspaper. Feller’s local knowledge of coastal processes
was systematically belittled through public scientific experimentation. Feller himself
explained that the biggest problem with outsiders’ understanding of the erosion crisis is
their lack of a holistic approach. As he explained, simply focusing on one thing, i.e. sea
level rise or coastal erosion, will not make things better. He suggested that first
“… you let the water flow. The coast will grow with the sea level [since
mangroves function as sediments traps]. Surely! At some point the mangroves
will create a natural dam for you but that will be in 50 or 60 years. But then you
have time to adjust. … at some point you will still have a water problem and that
is when you need to decide: do I stay or not … it is a sustainable solution because
as the sea level rises, you can still use the land and the water. The people will
have fish and they can continue with agricultural practices.”

Much has been written about modernism and its discontents (Scott 1999) but
developing countries like Suriname are still fixated on engineering solutions that give a
perception of increased development and modernization. The Dutch consulting firm that
provided social and environmental impact assessment for the seawall in Coronie actually
provided an alternative “soft engineering” option, one that involved planting a mangrove
buffer north of the seawall. This was rejected by the state without any explanation
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however. The desire for large scale engineering projects, the need to be modern and
“developed,” and the rejection of local or peasant knowledge, is built on a development
mirage. Many rich countries that reached “developed” status are starting to internalize the
externalities of such engineering projects and they are undergoing somewhat of a
paradigm shift. In the United States, river dams are being removed to allow for fisheries
to return. In The Netherlands, dykes are removed to allow the flooding of farmland as the
land was intended to function as a flood zone. These countries are starting to work with
the natural functions of ecosystems rather than attempt to engineer ecosystems for
optimal benefit (Adger et al. 2005). It would greatly benefit countries like Suriname to
recognize this and build solutions that are inclusive of local knowledge by creating
institutions that encourage participation and transparency.
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CHAPTER SIX
POLITICS OF SEAWALL CONSTRUCTION

Introduction

The urgent need to address SLR from climate change is clearly stated in several
government studies. As a non-Annex I member of the UNFCCC, Suriname regularly
reports on its status with respect to mitigation and adaptation through so-called National
Communications. The First National Communication to the UNFCCC (FNC) (Ministry
of Labour, Technological Development and Environment, 2006) and the subsequent
Netherlands Climate Assistance Program (NCAP) Phase 2 (2007) warn of the potential
significant impacts of SLR although some of these warnings can be misleading as was
elaborated in chapter three.
One local adaptation measure is the planning and construction of a 12 kilometer
seawall in Coronie starting in 2006. The general perception is that coastal erosion was at
least partly due to ongoing sea level rise. A study was also completed to assess the
possibility of building a seawall north of the capital city, Paramaribo, to protect it from
ongoing coastal erosion and sea level rise, but I was not able to obtain a copy of this
report from the government or the engineering firm who wrote it. Meanwhile, the GOS
has announced that it intends to construct a seawall along the entire coastline of Suriname
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when it signed an MOU with China Harbor, an international Chinese firm (De Ware Tijd,
June 12, 2010). Seawall construction is obviously taken seriously by the government as a
policy response to SLR.
Climate change adaptation is not a politically neutral process, and there will be
winners and losers for each adaptation including seawall construction. The Coronie
seawall has a price tag of more than 50 million euros and is being constructed against the
wishes of the local environmental group led by Mr. Feller. The relatively high cost of the
Coronie seawall actually received remarkably little resistance from the general public or
members of the political opposition in a political climate where such large-scale
expenditures by the government do not go unnoticed. When searching through archives
of local newspapers, I did not find any mention that questioned the cost effectiveness of
this project, other than the articles that were written by Feller in which he argues for a
wider more integrated water management approach for the district. Large projects such as
the seawall will always have multiple viewpoints and players, some more powerful than
others which can create an unequal playing field. This chapter examines the politics of
the current seawall construction, especially the cost, with the intend to better understand
what can be expected from the state in future adaptations.

Cost of Adaptation

The World Bank (2010) estimates that the cost of adaptation will be in the range
of USD 70 to 100 billion per year by 2020. The consensus is that wealthy countries, those
that are responsible for the historical high emissions of CO2, need to help poor nations
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adapt to the impacts of climate change. Several funds have been established from which
non-annex I country governments can request adaptation assistance by submitting
proposals. The largest of these funds, The Adaptation Fund, approved its first project in
the amounts of USD8.62 million for a proposal from Senegal in September 2010
(www.climatefundsupdate.org, last accessed March 14, 2012). This project is aimed at
“combating coastal erosion exacerbated by climate change and rising sea levels in
Senegal,” a title with peculiar similarities to the Suriname struggle.
There are three major concerns with the high cost of adaptation that was proposed
by the World Bank. First, people who work in development fear that development aid
will basically be re-packaged as climate change or adaptation aid. By reducing money for
alleviating poverty and improving health, education, women empowerment projects, one
important piece of the adaptation framework namely social vulnerability, will be ignored
for projects that are most likely controlled by national governments and will undoubtedly
have a political character. Such projects are usually expensive large-scale engineering
projects (Bryant and Bailey 1997) that have been shown to increase vulnerability of
socially weak groups by, for example, relocating people to environmentally less attractive
locations.
Second, small governments in the global south generally lack the ability to absorb
such large amounts of funds. The lack of capacity, and often transparency and
participation, will not lead to sustainable adaptation measures. In other words, having
adaptive capacity, in this case financial adaptive capacity, does not necessarily lead to
adaptation (Ballesteros et al. 2010). It is more likely that a majority of the funds will be
spent on expensive consultants whose deliverables consist of a few reports based on desk
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studies or for organizing workshops that can easily cost tens of thousands of dollars
because foreign “experts” have to be flown in to explain what local people already know.
When adaptation projects are indeed implemented, corruption and nepotism will be
difficult to avoid. Contracts tend to be awarded to companies that are loyal to the political
leadership and often to family members who claim expertise in the subject. Conflict of
interest in procurement is a hollow term in places like Suriname, partly because it is a
small society with a small group of people who can compete for consulting contracts. A
final concern is that there is an expectation from developing countries that this money
will become available if they can show vulnerability. Vulnerability may therefore be
exaggerated and perhaps even increased by inaction while the cost of adaptation options
becomes less of a consideration. Large engineering infrastructures may become desired
or expected.

Adaptation Costs in Suriname. The financial cost of coastal adaptations can
become quite significant with no end in sight. According to Suriname’s First National
Communication to the UNFCCC (2005), capital losses could reach USD30 billion in
Suriname with 1 meter SLR. Another climate change study shows that this loss could be
mitigated by constructing a series of dykes, raising existing dykes, and investing in new
pumps for the approximate price tag of USD 470 million (Ministry of Public Works,
1999). The 12 kilometer seawall at Coronie is already in an advanced stage of
construction and has a price tag of at least EURO 50 million. Other plans to construct a
seawall along the entire 386 kilometers northern coastline of Suriname are being
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developed by the Ministry of Public Works and this would most likely have a very high
cost relative to the country’s GDP.
Among people in the communities in Weg Naar Zee and Totness as well as
government officials there seems to be a certain trust in seawall construction that may be
related to a familiarity with Dutch coastal defense systems. Most Surinamese civil
engineers completed their studies in The Netherlands and many Surinamese have visited
or have family living there. Several informants have shown blind trust in Suriname’s
ability to copy Dutch sea defenses as expressed by one informant:
“Look … tell the European countries that if they don’t want us to cut
our forest, they can build a dyke for us. You can build a thousand
industries, but without a dyke it is of no use. [The dyke] is the main
thing. Holland is also below sea level and they have a dyke. The Dutch
are the best dyke builders so it shouldn’t be a problem at all.”

The Netherlands, however, is an annex I country with sufficient capital and
technical expertise to reduce its vulnerability to coastal storm surges and sea level rise.
Moreover, The Netherlands uses 5% of its total GDP only on managing water. Another
country that is closer to Suriname and has similar circumstances is Guyana. In terms of
seawalls and adaptation cost, there is much that can be learned from Guyana. Plantations
were built along major rivers in Suriname but in Guyana they were established primarily
along the coast. Human modification of the coast in Guyana is much more severe and has
a longer history. Similar to Suriname, nearly 90% of the population lives along the coast
and is exposed to frequent flooding. Sea defense construction began much earlier. A 240
km seawall was built in the 1960s to protect coastal assets and reduce vulnerability to
flooding. However, one can argue that this actually increased socio-economic
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vulnerability in Guyana as population density continued to rise in the floodplains. The
Guyanese economy has been burdened tremendously by the construction and
maintenance cost of its seawall.
The Guyana Sea Defense Board estimates that $2000 per meter (1990 dollars) is
spent only on maintenance and rehabilitation annually in Guyana (Teunissen, 2003). This
comprises at least 10% of its GDP (D. Singh, personal communication, February 21,
2012). A different report lists US$3000 per meter as the cost for sea defense works in
Guyana (it is not clear if this is construction or maintenance) and US$ 20 million for the
construction cost of a different 8 kilometer seawall in west Suriname (Teunissen, 2003).
The report also states that rehabilitation and reconstruction for the entire seawall is
US$750 million. Again, these figure are vague as they do not indicate any detail, but
there is some consistency with costs from different sources and the known costs for the
more recent project in Suriname. It can be safely concluded that as a result of the high
costs in Guyana, the Guyanese government has less to spend on social welfare such as
healthcare or education which also negatively affects social vulnerability. Housing
developments behind the seawall, a result of the levee effect, has increased and more
people are now at risk from flooding in the case of an extreme event.
The Guyanese seawall has also resulted in many environmental changes. The
mudbank process described in chapter 2, for example, has been disrupted and the
geomorphic processes do not behave in the same way resulting in less protection for
mangroves and in most cases a complete lack of mangrove forests along the Guyana
coast which has additional impacts on fisheries. Areas behind the seawall have also
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subsided such that many parts along the coast, for example in the capital city
Georgetown, are already below sea level.
Suriname has fared better economically than Guyana over the last decades and
perhaps a case can be made that Suriname should use its financial adaptive capacity like
other Western countries. Interviews with farmers and government officials show that
there is a faith, perhaps blind faith, that Suriname can do what The Netherlands have
done. Even the Dutch, however, have changed their management strategies to use
existing ecosystem functions rather than engineer their way out of environmental
challenges (Adger et al. 2005). As mentioned earlier, the Dutch currently use floodplains
to allow floodwater to accumulate and drain slowly, rather than build defense systems
and spend resources to pump the water as fast as possible out to sea. Farmers in these
floodplain are compensated for their losses based on the previous season’s market prices
and average yield per hectare.
Returning once more to the cost of the Coronie seawall, I asked different people
involved with the project about their perspectives regarding the relatively high cost.
These people belonged to three groups: the project management team at the Ministry of
PLOS which was responsible for executing the project, the Dutch Embassy who funded
much of the sea wall through development assistance, and engineers who worked on the
project design. I also used government reports to gather additional perspectives from
local ecologists. Below are four leading perspectives by different actors:

The construction of a seawall usually proceeds when economic activities in the
protected area (protected from the seawall) can cover the cost of construction, and
when the cost of regular maintenance is known. If these criteria cannot be
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satisfied then the seawall is not economically justified … economic activities in
the risk zone will not even cover maintenance costs of the seawall. It is therefore
not economically justified (Teunissen, P. 2004. Project Studies Bouw Coronie
Dijk, Bijlage 6, Interne Nota, Natuurlijke en Kunstmatige kustbescherming
Distrikt Coronie, p. 19).

A lower cost is possible if the seawall is constructed in an alternative location,
closer to the East-West Road, in the amount of 20,000,000 euros [instead of the
projected cost of 36,250,000 euros when built north of the road]. This alternative
location will however have greater negative socio-economic impacts and
appropriate policies should be developed for financial compensation of the local
community, land purchases, development of economic alternatives, and the
construction of new infrastructure such as roads, houses and schools (Augustinus,
2004, p. 2).

… every engineering object built has an economic justification, but not in
Suriname. Here we build them because they are politically interesting … If you
don’t build this seawall, than Mr. Bouterse will win the presidential elections and
the country will be plundered anyway. The economic damage that the country
will encounter from Alibux, Goedschalk, van der Heuvel, Wormer, Tong [current
and former members, or supporters, of Mr. Bouterse’s regimes] will be 100 times
greater than the [cost of the] seawall (Engineer, Paramaribo, October 16, 2009).

With this seawall you cannot solve the problem … [The solution] is to let
freshwater flow from the swamp to the coast where the mangroves are. As the sea
level rises, so the coast will rise. Later on, you will have to take care of water
drainage. Only then will you have to decide: do I stay or do I move, but that is a
long term issue ... that decision will have to be made in 50 or 60 years and that
gives you the time to adapt (Feller, A. personal communication, October 3, 2009).
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[Regarding the flow of freshwater to the mangroves and natural protection against
coastal erosion] … based on our study … none of the scientists could give us this
guarantee (Government official, Paramaribo, December 4, 2009).

These statements show the intensely political meanings attached to the seawall
construction. The first three statements address the cost of the project and all argue that it
was not economically justified. The question therefore is how important economic
justification is in adaptation work? Given that most developing countries will have
limited funds to implement similar large scale engineering projects, who should benefit
the most? The last two quotes show the difficulty in comparing economic and ecological
justifications in the seawall project. Here, again, the ramifications of accepting one type
of knowledge and denying another has political outcomes.
The third respondent quoted above is an engineer with knowledge of the seawall’s
construction. He makes a strong connection between the current political milieu and the
military dictatorship from 1980 to 1987 led by Mr. Bouterse, and furthermore believes
that infrastructure investments, in this case a coastal adaptation to manage erosion and
SLR, are to be used as political instruments. During the time of data collection, Mr.
Bouterse’s party was poised to win a majority in the 2010 elections and discussions
frequently veered towards politics and the upcoming elections during interviews. The
important thing to recognize is that this statement is also a confirmation and recognition
of the dynamic nature of local politics and how it influences decision making. This is of
course not only true in Suriname but also internationally. Decisions that are of interest in
this case include who will benefit from climate change adaptations and other investments,
who pays for these, and how this influences future political events and decisions.

125

Adaptation and Electioneering

Given the timing of the seawall construction and the close outcome of the
elections, several people have suggested that the Coronie Seawall was an attempt to ‘buy
votes’ since a candidate in Coronie only requires 550 votes to win a seat in parliament.
The engineer (third respondent above) believes that there is no economic justification but
that the seawall was politically justified. If this was the case, then an election victory and
the defeat of Bouterse’s party was to ensure continuation of political power. Since a
majority of people in Totness were in favor of the seawall and only a minority argued for
alternative approaches, it must have come as a shock that both parliamentary seats were
won by the opposition party led by Mr. Bouterse.

International Political Pressure. The cost of the seawall was first estimated to
cost 245,000 euros, but quickly ballooned to 25 million euros and now stands at an
impressive 50 to 55 million euros. A government representative explained the evolution
of the cost of the seawall: when plans were originally drafted for the seawall in 2005,
which was the start of president Venetiaan’s second term, the intention was to use Dutch
Development Aid. As the government was nearing the end of its term, it decided to use
the development aid to pay off another loan to the Dutch government. Funds that had
been budgeted to pay off this loan then became available and were instead used for the
seawall. It was a simple swap of money used to either pay off a loan to the Dutch
government or pay a Dutch engineering firm to build the seawall. The simple way in
which this was explained, the political nature of Suriname / Dutch relationships, and the
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expected election loss with a probable Bouterse presidency makes me believe that this
was not a simple swap but probably had something to do with the fact that one source of
Dutch development aid cannot be modified after it has been dedicated for a project while
another source of funds (the loan payoff) was in the national budget and could be used for
other purposes if it was not used before the elections. This is not substantiated by any of
the respondents and remain speculation on my part. After the loan payoff funds were
redirected towards the seawall, there was still a shortfall in the order of 26 million euros.
This was covered by the Development Aid after all. The total cost of the Coronie seawall
and another dyke in the Commewijne River were 98 million euros as of December 2009.
Both jobs are being completed by Dutch engineering firms.
One respondent in Coronie agreed that these engineering projects were politically
motivated but also believed that it was the Dutch, in fact, pressured the Venetiaan
government to spend the funds sooner rather than later. The respondent concludes that it
was also in the Dutch government’s interest to have a non-Bouterse government in
power. I posed this scenario to a high-ranking government official and a representative
from the Dutch embassy and both denied the claim. Past events, however, do support this
to a certain extent.
By 2005, the Dutch government made it publicly known that it wanted to end the
Development Aid commitments to Suriname that it started in 1975 and that it intended to
complete these funds by Venetiaan’s second term. Moreover, the historical distribution of
aid (see table 4.1) provides evidence that the Dutch would rather have a non-Bouterse
government in place and would, therefore, support any efforts by the coalition
government to win the elections. Two easy and speedy ways to spend development aid
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are by paying off existing debts or building an expensive engineering projects, especially
when the expertise for such projects are in house, i.e. dam and seawall construction.
Schalkwijk (2009) also states that whatever funds were not used by 2010, would be given
to Suriname as a one-time gift. Given the history and the complicated relationship
between consecutive Dutch and Surinamese governments, the claim that the seawall
construction was as much a political decision as an engineering one can be supported.
This has implications for how we understand the process of decision-making relative to
future climate change adaptation projects.

The Challenge of Normative Adaptation

Participation, transparency and accountability have been identified as important
factors in climate change adaptation, especially when undertaken at the community level
(Adger et al. 2005, Ballesteros 2010). Suriname has a dismal record on these issues
however which further threatens success of future coastal adaptation policies.
Participation is high during elections but participation in decision-making after elections
is generally difficult. The government also shows a distaste for community led or comanagement of natural resources. Transparency, like participation, is inadequate when it
comes to government projects. Transparency International (2012) gives Suriname a score
of 3 on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 is “very corrupt” and 10 means “very clean”
(www.transperency.org, last accessed March 14, 2012). Suriname’s political party
systems makes it increasingly difficult to keep elected leaders accountable, especially in
the districts. Each of these is briefly explained below as they pertain to adaptation politics
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and policies. These issues require a greater effort and in-depth analysis with additional
expertise than what I have been able to do here.
The Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (PLOS) which was in
charge of planning for the seawall construction organized several stakeholder meetings in
Coronie. While these stakeholder meetings are intended as forums where people could
have questioned answered and voice their concern, they are frequently used as marketing
campaigns to build support for the project and it is not uncommon that stakeholders
receive gifts and free food and alcohol is provided. Some meetings appeared to function
as a way to sway public opinion rather than address real concerns.
A Social and Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA) was apparently done for
the seawall but had not been shared yet with the stakeholders at the time of my research. I
was able to obtain a copy of the assessment from the Dutch Embassy and the interesting
thing about this SEIA is that it was completed after the seawall had already been
approved. As it turned out, the Suriname government applied for co-funding from ORET
which is a fund from the Dutch State Department that supports international
infrastructure projects in developing countries and it was the ORET
(Ontwikkelingsrelevante Export Transacties or Development related Export Transactions
Programme) fund that required a SEIA as a prerequisite for submitting a proposal. A
Dutch firm, DHV, was hired to perform the task. The most striking results from this study
was that the consultant provided an alternative green solution involving mangroves that
would cut cost significantly. In addition, the 30 year cost benefit analysis (CBA), a
standard timeframe in engineering projects neglects to include the maintenance cost of
the seawall despite the fact that this may become a major financial burden. Given that the

129

Guyana Sea Defense Board estimates that the government of Guyana spends $2000 per
meter in 1990 dollars on maintenance and rehabilitation annually (Teunissen, 2003), this
is a serious oversight. The important point here is that the second option that included
mangrove rehabilitation along with a hard concrete seawall was not presented to the
public. And since the SEIA was not made available to the public either, there was no
public debate on the strength and weakness of the SEIA study or the seawall.
The seawall project also failed to be transparent about the options of coastal
residents to be compensated for loss of land and other material assets by the state. While
the SEIA does compute a total loss of 10.6 million euros for loss of homes, factories,
infrastructure, land and agricultural production, this was not translated into payments to
local households. Surinamese law has a provision for compensating individuals if their
property is needed by the state to provide benefit to the general public, similar to the
eminent domain laws in the United States. Article 34 of the Suriname constitution states
that expropriation is only allowed if it is done for the public good. If the right and
competent authority destroys or renders the property unusable, then compensation is
required. Respondents in Coronie and Weg Naar Zee however believe that if the
government did nothing, they would lose their land to the encroaching sea and it
therefore makes sense that they are not compensated for lost property. They believe that
it is an acceptable sacrifice in order to gain protection from a new seawall. This could
have major implications for future climate change impacts when more land becomes
unproductive or is lost, and needs to be addressed so that vulnerable people are not
protected from one threat but simultaneously kept vulnerable through the loss of
important assets.
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Accountability is extremely problematic in Suriname in general. During general
elections, people elect members to parliament, the only house of representation, once
every five years. The highest local political representative is the District Commissioner
(DC). The DC is appointed by the minister of rural development, who is appointed by the
president, who is chosen by a two-thirds majority in parliament. These are the official
rules. The unofficial rules however dictate that the major political parties are controlled
by a small elite who decides which people are allowed to be placed on the ballots and
they determine who can serve in politically important positions in government. The lack
of democracy within the main parties can be deduced from the average length that party
chairs remain in power. Table 6.1 shows length of time of party chairpersons of the
current largest and oldest political parties. Each head of state since Suriname’s
independence in 1975 has come from the NPS, VHP or NDP and the ex-military dictator
(1980 to 1987) is the current NDP chairperson and president of the country.
The DC is supported in theory by members of the district commission (District
Raden – DR) and representatives of different resorts, the smallest geographic unit with
political representation (Ressort Raden - RR). While the DR and RR members are also
elected by the public during general elections, they cannot be kept accountable because
they do not have any real political power. The DC, who is responsible for giving permits
for buildings, factories and more, is given a small operating budget by the Ministry of
Finance. Moreover, the DC’s “loyalty” is towards the minister of rural development. The
de facto accountability is to the party chair however. This also goes for most management
level government positions.
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Table 6.1. Leadership retention of major political parties in Suriname.
Political Party
Current Chairperson
Serving

First

(acronym, year of inception)

(birthdate)

Since

Chair

National Democratic Party (NDP, 1987)

D. Bouterse (b. 1945)

1987

Yes

Pertjajah Luhur (PL, 1998)

P. Somohardjo (b. 1943)

1998

Yes

R. Brunswijk8 (b. 1961)

1990

Yes

C. Santhoki (b. 1959)

2011

No

R. Sardjoe (b. 1935)

20019

No

R. Venetiaan (b. 1936)

199310

No

General Freedom and Development Party
(ABOP, 1990)
Progressive Reform Party (VHP, 1947)
National Party of Suriname (NPS, 1946)

As a result of the weak system of accountability and representation, marginalized
groups tend to express complaints and frustration through the media which is free and
open. Small groups tend to create a local committee and write letters to the most
accessible minister, member of parliament, or even the president in an attempt to
participate in the decision making process. In Coronie, the Committee for the
Rehabilitation of the Northern Coronie Polder became the voice of the people concerned
with coastal erosion. Their main communication method was through newspaper articles
and seeking support of other groups. At Weg Naar Zee, the Organization for the
Concerns of Farmers at Weg Naar Zee. This group, which is led by a local Hindu
spiritual leader, has used similar communication tactics and has successfully had much

8

Ronnie Brunswijk was also the leader of the Jungle Commando which fought against
Bouterse’s military in the 1980’s in the so-called Interior War. He is now a member of
parliament and the NDP and ABOP are coalition partners in the current government.
9

Sardjoe became chair after Lachmon passed away who himself had been chair since
1947.
10

Venetiaan followed Arron who has been the party’s leader for 23 years.
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news coverage by inviting different news organization to film waves crashing into the
weakened coastline during high tide events.
Political responsibility is worsened by the complex organization of the
government. In terms of water management in Coronie, for example, multiple ministries
are tasked with the job. The Ministry of Natural Resources (NH) is responsible for
providing drinking water in the district and approving new permits for new wells. The
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (LVV), meanwhile, is responsible for
managing water related to agricultural systems such as canals near rice fields. The
Ministry of Public Works (OW) is responsible for maintaining other canals, roads,
bridges and more. These different roles and responsibilities have caused problems. The
situation was worsened when a new ministry was created to appease a new political party
in the resulting coalition after the 2005 elections: the Ministry of Spatial Planning, Land
and Forest Management (RGB). As we have already seen, the Ministry of Planning and
Development Cooperation (PLOS) was actually responsible for building the seawall
while the local DC was appointed by the Ministry of Rural Development (RO). Who are
the people of Coronie and Weg Naar Zee supposed to approach when environmental
crisis threatens their livelihoods?

International Politics and Policies. Tension stemming from representation and
accountability do not only reflect the dualism between local and state actors but are also
prevalent between different governments and international agencies. International rules
and regulations for climate change adaptation, as well as mitigation and funding
agreements, are decided at the UNFCCC meetings. Much attention has been paid to the
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issue of fairness in adaptation, i.e. who is responsible and who pays for it? The World
Bank has estimated that climate adaptation will cost between $70 and 100 billion each
year and it is expected that wealthy countries commit to this fund because developed
economies have been primarily responsible for the crisis and developing countries will be
most impacted. The mechanism by which these funds will be distributed is still being
debated.
International funding has thus far paid for climate change studies in Suriname
which has been a mixed blessing. The Dutch Climate Assistance Program (NCAP), for
example, funded two studies that assessed vulnerability and determined adaptation
options for Suriname. Meanwhile, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) funds have
been used so far to produce the First and Second National Communication to the
UNFCCC. These much needed funds provide trainings for local consultants and increase
awareness of climate change vulnerability in Suriname. From a policy perspective,
however, there has been very little response from the government. In meetings with
government officials, not a single person made reference to any of these studies unless
specifically asked. People who live in Coronie and Weg Naar Zee are not aware of these
reports either.
A mid-level government official I interviewed who is involved with drafting new
environmental policies believes that the government is interested in funding
opportunities rather than addressing real climate concerns, and expresses this loss of
opportunity: “[the government of Suriname] only completes these studies to check them
off. These studies are supposed to offer directions for new policies, but in Suriname we
don’t do things to bring change. We only do them to accommodate international

134

conventions.” If international funding is going to create real adaptation solutions to the
vulnerable communities, these warnings should be addressed in funding mechanisms.
There is real frustration on the part of small governments who attend international
negotiations but are subjected to geopolitical maneuvering by larger and more powerful
players. A representative of the Surinamese delegation (Anonymous, 2009) explained
how he presented the government’s position on forestry related matters at the
Copenhagen UNFCCC meeting. As he sat alone representing Suriname in a large
auditorium, he witnessed how a team of 60 Brazilian foresters, lawyers and other experts
rotated every couple of hours during the 14-hour debate in order to ensure that Brazil’s
position was included in any new UNFCCC document. Another mid-level government
official explained to me that the government accepts funding for environmental studies
with disdain because the funds are tightly controlled but that they are much needed to pay
for staff salaries and travel to international meetings, and for reporting on documents that
Suriname is required to submit as a signatory of the different conventions.
Small nations have reacted to the uneven power positions by combining limited
resources and establishing coalitions of countries with similar interests. Suriname’s
position, for example, is now presented by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) as
it is considered part of the group of Small Islands Developing States (SIDS). Perhaps the
frustration of smaller countries like Suriname is best expressed in the quote below.
“… discussion in international arenas are led by a new sense of the capacity to
influence other state’s policies, whether to harmonize them (generate conformity
across nations and within international regimes and ‘best practices’), or to assist
them to become more ‘rational’ and ‘participatory’. In the context international
agencies have been engaged in funding and assisting ‘policy reviews’, and cocoordinating these in regional programmers. Such reviews provide opportunities
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for international leverage over national agenda-setting, not only in the elaboration
of policies, but also in the capacity subsequently to hold countries accountable to
them” (Fairhead and Leach 2003, p. 28-29).

In an effort to make the climate finance framework more transparent, the
establishment of a Green Climate Fund was proposed at COP16, as part of the Cancun
Agreement, with a $100 billion per year goal and was approved at COP17 in Durban in
December 2011. This fund is being designed to give developing countries greater control
of the application, approval and implementation process and should become a fund of all
funds, incorporating many of the funds listed above. The World Bank was assigned to be
the interim manager for the fund for three years even though international civil society
actors strongly objected because the Bank has proven to be extremely bureaucratic and
inflexible. This step was hardly avoidable since the Bank serves as the trustee for most
existing climate change funds.

Conclusions

The largest recent removal of mangroves in Suriname has occurred in Coronie for
the construction of a seawall, an area several hundred meters wide and 12 kilometers
long. With a price tag of over 50 million euros, this project should have received
considerable economic scrutiny but unfortunately this was not the case. Instead, the
engineering project has shown to be politically motivations from both the national
government and the international donor. This is real concern considering that the global
cost of adaptation has been estimated to cost billions of dollars each year. These funds
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will be intended for actual adaptation projects with the goal of reducing vulnerability to
climate change for as many people as possible, for the most vulnerable people, in as
quickly a timeframe as possible, and in a cost-effective manner. Other considerations
include ecological concerns which can be considered by including externalities in the cost
analysis, which is by no means an easy task.
Given a concern for the most vulnerable, the seawall failed the people of Totness.
While the seawall will stop coastal erosion, existing socio-economic vulnerabilities of the
community in Totness such as high unemployment and poverty have been completely
neglected in the project’s design. The district has the highest unemployment in the
country but despite the high budget of 50 million euros, all labor and expertise are
brought from outside Totness, sometimes as far as The Netherlands. From my analysis in
chapter 3, it is understandable that capacity may be lacking in Coronie but the state
missed a real opportunity to reverse the trend in the district and invest in job creation
schemes. The people of Coronie may now be saved from SLR but will continue to drown
in poverty.
Through a United Nations led process, countries like Suriname are given the
opportunity to report on the state of vulnerability and adaptation in the country. These
efforts are generally well received because they gather statistics on different countries so
that real trends in vulnerability can be established. The perception in Suriname among
mid-level government officials is that the funds to write these consultant reports are far
more important to pay salaries than the actual content. Higher level government officials
did not show any knowledge of the content or existence of these reports.
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There is also a concern about how these reports will be used when some of the
international adaptation money becomes available. Will wealthy countries dictate the
terms of implementation while poor countries cannot demand similar terms of those
countries that are the highest emitters? Will donor agencies demand participation of local
populations, as it should be, while participation of developing countries is weakened at
international negotiations?
Regardless of the answers, it behooves policy makers in Suriname to scrutinize
the current obsession with seawall construction. A closer analysis of the seawall in
Guyana, rather than sea defense structures in The Netherlands, should reveal valuable
insight into the effects of seawalls on mangroves, mudbank movement, and most
importantly the well-being of the most vulnerable people. Moreover, the government of
Suriname could possible fall into a trap whereby expensive seawalls are built by the
Dutch, which then have to be maintained by the Dutch, eventually lead to much greater
debt owed to the Dutch, and thus creating new structural problems and political
dependencies.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS

This research project assessed how climate change adaptation to sea level rise
(SLR) in Suriname is influenced by discourses of mangroves and SLR, development
histories and politics, and existing coastal management practices. The need for adaptation
is based on Suriname’s high exposure and sensitivity to SLR, particularly in the coastal
zone where 75% of the urban and rural population lives on land that is 1 to 2 meters
above sea level. The two study sites, Weg Naar Zee and Totness in the districts of
Wanica and Coronie respectively, have been experiencing erosion which is believed to be
at least partly due to ongoing SLR.

Reconsidering Mangroves and Sea Level Rise

Globally, discourses of mangrove function should be treated with caution when
they are scaled down to local conditions. These discourses claim almost universal
protection against coastal erosion and often include images of mangrove species with stilt
roots. Such discourses are repeated locally during mangrove awareness campaigns that
usually feature images of red mangroves (mangro) which have stilt roots, but do not
occur in significant numbers along the Suriname coast. Meanwhile, images of supposed
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'human destruction' show fallen down black mangroves (parwa) that do not have stilt
roots and are therefore subject to erosion from wave energy. The fishermen who I
interviewed were not even aware of the local narrative that mangrove wood was used in
fishing activities. They explained why it would be illogical and a waste of resources to
use live mangrove as the wood is too wet to burn, too soft for use with fishing nets, and
there are too many other alternative wood species in Suriname that function much better.
While mangroves are known to provide protection from storm surges and limit
coastal erosion (Alongi 2008), they behave quite differently in Suriname. The presence of
mudbanks is essential for the growth of mangroves along the Suriname coast. This is
because mudbanks provide protection from wave energy so that seedlings can get
established and mature trees are not uprooted. Mudbanks also provide large quantities of
sediment which are trapped by the mangrove root systems and allow the coast to grow
outward and upward. Where mudbanks are not present, the coast usually erodes at a
surprisingly fast rate. Research along the French Guiana coast, where a similar system of
mangroves and mudbanks can be found, shows that up to four kilometers of coastal zone
can be gained and lost during these interbank phases which can take 10 to 20 years.
Scientific explanations of the impact of SLR in Suriname remain inconclusive.
Will mangroves protect the coast from erosion or will they diminish as the sea level
rises? McLeod and Salm (2006) have indicated that mangroves will migrate landward
with rising sea levels where conditions permit. Parkinson et. al. (1994) analyzed the
impacts of SLR on parwa systems in the Caribbean during the early Holocene when SLR
was faster than the current predictions for the next century. They found that mangroves
would not migrate landward as long as the supply of sediments remains uninterrupted.
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Evidence shows that both processes, landward migration and sediment accumulation,
have taken place in the Caribbean (Alongi 2008) but it is not clear how parwa trees in
Suriname in particular behaved or will behave in the future. We can assume with high
certainty that the supply of sediments will not become a limiting factor in the near future.
The Amazon produces several million tons per day (Allison et. al. 2000) of which less
than 10% is stored in migrating mudbanks (Augustinus 2004).
Other natural phenomenon and human changes to the landscape influence coastal
ecology. Gratiot et al. (2008) found that during the 18.6 year cycle, mean high water
(MHW) fluctuated approximately 0.12 meters and these periods of extreme high and low
water account for most of the mangrove loss and gain. Up to 2 km was lost during the
cycle peak period and 3 km of mangrove forest was gained during the cycle low period,
regardless of the presence/absence of mudbanks. Local knowledge of coastal systems
places much more emphasis on the uninterrupted flow of freshwater from coastal swamps
to the mangrove dominated coastline so that favorable brackish water (lower salinity than
seawater) can be maintained naturally. Mr. Feller from Coronie described mudbank
assisted growth as active growth and freshwater assisted growth, in the absence of
mudbanks, as passive growth.
The juxtaposition of Gratiot et al and Feller provides an insight into how power
intersects with different kinds of knowledge. Surinamese scientists do not agree with
Feller’s assessment and have publicly challenged his knowledge claims. They have not,
however, challenged Gratiot et al.’s peer-reviewed paper which also shows that
mudbanks are not the only determinant of mangrove growth or loss. It is likely that
Gratiot et al have not been challenged because of the greater inaccessibility of academic
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knowledge. Published knowledge that is not read by anyone has no avenue for creating
power and not one person that I interviewed, government or public, is aware of this
paper’s existence. None of the government reports and consultant studies make mention
of this paper either. It is possible that local scientists are aware but that they chose to
ignore it because the “inconvenient truth” in the paper would directly challenge the
narrative that has been created.
It is highly unlikely that Gratiot et al.’s results would be understood by coastal
residents because a fluctuation of 12 cm of MSL is insignificant to the human eye over a
timespan of two decades. The political importance of this publication is that it provides a
counter narrative to the mudbank narrative, one which would strengthen the local
community in Totness to explain that other processes are important for coastal
geomorphology as well. Access to information is, therefore, not only important for
participation in decision making but also for marginalized groups to gain or maintain
power. This access is extremely difficult given the inaccessibility of peer-reviewed
publications for people who may not even have Internet access, let alone know how to
search for these publications, interpret the often technical language, and formulate
counter narratives to the dominant discourse at appropriate venues.
Global discourses of the actual rise of sea levels have created unclear local
narratives which hampers adaptation policy making. A focus on IPCC predictions of SLR
in 2100 means that the immediate and local ways in which rising sea levels are
experienced are ignored. Annual or bi-annual high tide water events that cause flooding
and salinization of agricultural lands, and rising low tides that prevent drainage of excess
water by gravity, should receive much more attention from policy makers. The steady
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increase of extreme events stresses coastal communities by overwhelming them and
gradually breaking down coping abilities (Pelling 2011). Discourse of long term gradual
SLR increase is better suited for areas that experience minimal tidal influence. Similarly,
the focus should not only be on the rise of high waters but also the rise of low waters
because these inhibit sluice gate managers to successfully drain excess water from the
land into local rivers by gravity. This effect may be more immediate than flooding but is
yet to receive any acknowledgement from policy makers.

Local and Scientific Knowledge. Given the limitations of both local and
scientific knowledge (Agrawal 1995), a combined knowledge is required for developing
sustainable climate change policies (Batterbury et. al. 1997; Mercer et. al. 2010).
Scientific knowledge has many technological advantages, and the benefits of remote
sensing for understanding coastal processes are unmistakable, but it often does not
address social understandings of nature and how these are embedded in dominant
discourses (Castree and Braun 2001). Neither can a positivist understanding of coastal
dynamics capture the richly textured understandings of local communities that explain
complex ecological processes. Local knowledge has its limitations too, however. It
requires time to capture ecological processes of timescales longer than one or more
generations. Respondents from Totness, for example, gave much more detailed
explanations of coastal processes than those at WNZ where among all households
interviewed no one mentioned the word "mudbank" when asked to explain coastal
processes.
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What does an approach to adaptation that relies on a combined local and scientific
knowledge look like in Suriname? The first step would be to deconstruct dominant
discourses by providing counter narratives of alternate truth claims to both local residents
and government officials. One approach may be to focus on high tide events that can
submerge swaths of mangrove forests and cause massive die-off. This phenomenon has
been described by Teunissen (2004, internal nota) as a critical area for coastal
management in Suriname. This approach also needs to juxtapose the different
explanations of mangrove loss and gain along the coast and show that one single
explanation does not hold true in all cases of mangrove loss and growth along the coast
thus far. It would reinforce the fact that the system is too complex to explain by one or
two processes alone and that learning through adaptive management should be the focus.
Another important biophysical process that needs to be better understood and that could
gain much from a combined knowledge of processes of sediment accumulation and
creations of 'mangrove cemeteries'. Others have also provided recommendations for
adaptation decision-making that advocates greater inclusion of local perspectives. In a
review of the climate change literature, Pelling (2011) listed three important aspects of a
more equitable social contract:
“Recognition demands acceptance of minority perspectives in planning and
decision-making processes, implying that the views and aspirations of the most
marginalized and vulnerable be acknowledged. Participation requires access to
knowledge so that all affected parties can formulate informed viewpoints and be
involved in the decision-making process with engagement ranging from
consultation to local autonomy. Distribution relates to who holds and uses power
to ensure equal participation and recognition of the weakest in decision-making”
(p49).
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Centralized management of the highly dynamic 400 km coastline by a small
group of under-funded but otherwise well-meaning government employees in Paramaribo
should be questioned, and there should be agreement that this approach is limited. An
alternative approach is for local people to have greater agency in managing local
resources. This requires a major paradigm shift and is a direct challenge to the current
discourse, but the ultimate result would be better management of coastal resources which
is the proclaimed bottom line by the state. It requires increased knowledge sharing, from
local to global and across the artificial local / scientific divide, and increased power
sharing, to empower people in a context where the dominant discourse is often presented
as the only possible reality.
I would be remiss if I did not offer critique here of the very notion of local and
scientific knowledge. My use of the word local, rather than indigenous or ecological
knowledge, was to clarify that important knowledge exists with local communities who
do not identify themselves as scientists but as farmers or fishermen. Their knowledge is,
however, by no means non-scientific. One fisherman described to me in detail the life
cycle of different fish species and how period high tide events were necessary to allow
juveniles to hatch in mangrove areas. In my function as technical manager at
Conservation International Suriname, I also worked with a field technician who was
illiterate and could barely write his first name but could tell me the common and
scientific name of dozens of tree species as we walked through the forest. Thus, there are
local AND scientific knowledges. Another weakness in this divide is that scientific and
non-local knowledge is often only attributed to outside experts. Where do Surinamese
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scientists fall? My hope is that we move beyond the socially constructed division of local,
indigenous, ecological knowledge on one side and scientific, western, published or
formal knowledge on the other. One first step may be to use the counter narrative of
combined or inclusive knowledge which is recognized to be always incomplete and yet
better than using only one of the aforementioned knowledges.

Histories of Development

Regarding the historical development of Totness, the question remains why local
residents were not as proactive in water management in the mid-20th century as they had
been a hundred years earlier when they were faced with a similar challenge. Totness was
transformed during this time from an isolated but self-reliant community to one that was
increasingly connected to national politics and the global economy. The Totness story has
similarities with the case of Hausa peasants in northern Nigeria (Watts 1983) who
appeared to have lost knowledge and expertise in dealing with particular hazards over
time. Watts analyzed how a series of new rules by British colonizers changed the 'real
and moral economies' (Castree 2005) of the Hausa and thereby increased their
vulnerability to hazards which they had adapted to previously. After several failed high
modernist projects (Scott 1998) led residents in Totness to abandon their livelihood
practices based on extensive local knowledge, they became increasingly dependent on
agricultural practices that required high energy inputs including pesticides which likely
played a factor in the rapid decline of mangroves. Autonomy for monitoring and
maintaining local infrastructure, or the lack thereof, was slowly being structured for local
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residents by different state interventions. The resulting dominant discourse of reliance on
the state for management of local resources can also be seen in WNZ where residents
have vivid memories of how they managed the land in the past, often using only
manpower, but today wait for the state to provide assistance.

Politics of Adaptation. Adaptations are not politically neutral and the latest
attempt for political maneuvering appears to be the 50 million euro seawall in Totness.
High ranking officials with the Suriname government and the Dutch embassy in
Suriname responsible for managing the funds for the seawall denied that the seawall was
in any way politically motivated. They explained that the project was urgent for
protecting the community in Totness and the Oost-West Verbinding which connects
Paramaribo to the economically important westerly district of Nickerie. It is highly
unlikely that the seawall was not politically motivated, however, given that the seawall
was funded in large part by government development aid and given the complex
historical relationship of The Netherlands and Suriname. As the political opposition led
by the ex-military dictator, Mr. Bouterse, was gaining support among large parts of the
Suriname population, it makes sense that current elites would attempt to maintain the
status quo. Since the parliamentary seats in Coronie require the least amount of votes, it
would also make sense that the government would invest in this district hoping to sway
opinion and capture their votes. A critical mistake was made by simply focusing on
reducing vulnerability to coastal erosion and SLR and not reduction in existing socioeconomic vulnerability, which are very high in Totness. The government allowed for
politically well-connected elites to reap enormous profits through subcontracts on the
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seawall project while neglecting to reduce unemployment by insisting that local labor be
used in the seawall’s construction. The result was a significant loss of parliamentary seats
and a loss of national elections.
The government also failed to do proper environmental and social impact
assessments before the project was approved. If this seawall alters the behavior of
mudbanks further west, this will become disastrous for the economy of Nickerie. Another
likely scenario is that the currently approaching mudbank allows a mangrove forest to
grow north of the seawall which will make it one of the costliest maladaptations in the
world. If this 50 million euro seawall will sit behind a mangrove forest in one or two
decades, it is not inconceivable that this will be used as examples in the international
literature for how not to adapt to climate change. It is too early to know if this will
happen and how this critique might alter future funding from multilateral and bilateral
agencies that are queuing up to provide billions of dollars in adaptation funds.
Adaptation interventions should never merely focus on future biophysical
vulnerability while ignoring pre-existing socioeconomic vulnerabilities (Ribot 2010).
Similarly, social scientists should take note of the multiple ways that small changes in
timing of biological events and suitable geographic ranges of plants and animals will
affect the well-being of people (Hannah 2010). This research has shown how local
histories and an understanding of local minority voices can start providing the foundation
for a situated environmental science necessary for developing normative adaptation
solutions. This requires some changes on the part of those that maintain power.
Within this context of power, it is necessary for any suggested adaptation solution
to understand who will be the winners and losers, or whose climate vulnerability will be
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reduced by the implementation of the adaptation. I have shown above how the seawall
reduced biophysical vulnerability but did not address socioeconomic vulnerability of the
people in Totness. What is necessary then is an increased awareness of an integrated
approach to climate adaptation. It requires a holistic understanding of all existing
vulnerabilities and risks that a community, or region, faces. Many of these will be nonclimate stressors such as landuse change, pollution and ineffective polices and
governance. Adaptation should address a multitude of issues simultaneously because the
drivers of vulnerability are linked in complex ways. A focus on only one driver of
vulnerability will most likely result in a transfer of risk to another driver. For example, in
WNZ, an integrated approach to adaptation would include local water management,
changes in land rights policies that do not require people to put the land “into production”
in order to gain title, research on salt tolerant crop varieties, options for migration if
erosion rapidly increases, research on the use of mangro instead of parwa mangrove
species, and more.
The focus thus far has been on the losers of certain adaptation measures, but I
have not paid much attention to the winners of adaptation. In the case of the Coronie
seawall, it has become clear that Dutch engineering firms are the clear winners in terms
of profits from the seawall construction. In a recent work trip to the Netherlands, I was
invited to visit different Dutch coastal defense structures and technological innovations
that maintain a freshwater lens of 1 meter depth on top of groundwater that is primarily
saltwater in some 60% of the country that lies below mean sea level. The Dutch may be
positioning themselves to reap enormous profits from the global threat of rising sea levels
to low-lying coastal regions. Given the populations in coastal cities that are at risk (see
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McGranahan et al, 2007), coastal defense engineering will become a gigantic global
industry for which the Dutch are poised to assume the leading position. Just like the
Dutch development assistance to Suriname was spent in large part on projects
implemented by Dutch engineering firms, how much of the World Bank’s estimated USD
70 to 100 billion a year will actually flow back to rich countries in the name of adaptation
aid? This issue requires attention to ensure that some form of Adger et al.’s (2005) notion
of normative adaptation can be achieved, one that is effective, efficient, equitable, and
legitimate.

Contributions to Political Ecology. I want to want finally address some of the
contributions this research has made to the field of political ecology by using Peter
Walker’s publications in which he asks questions about the ecology (2005), policy (2006)
and politics (2007) of today’s political ecology research. In what is now described as the
structural phase of political ecology (Walker, 2006), researchers often focused on “the
increased integration of Third World land users into global markets of unequal power
[which undermined] these landusers’ keen localized environmental knowledge …
creating [realities] that could potentially force land users to degrade their environments
…” (p. 74). This structural approach was followed by a focus on “power, knowledge and
practice” (Walker, 2005, p.75) thereby placing less emphasis on the ecology in this poststructural phase. Vayda and Walters (1999) have argued that this has resulted in a
‘politics without ecology’ (p. 168). Keeping this in mind, I’ve maintained a focus on
ecological dynamics in my research. This research is therefore situated in structural
(interaction of land use change and resource management with unequal power relations),
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post-structural (interaction of power, knowledge, and practice) and ecological approaches
to political ecology.
Political ecology is unique for its framework for understanding environmental
problems holistically. As Walker (2006) explains, however, many in the field feel no
obligation to actually engage policy makers. The field’s lack of ‘usefulness’ to
environmental and social policy makers is one of its main critiques. In fact, Walker
(2006) points out that political ecology has had “virtually no engagement with some of
the world’s most important international research programs dealing with environmental
change and human-environment relations, such as the International Panel on Climate
Change” (p. 383). My personal hope is that this research does reach the desks of policy
makers in Suriname and persuade them to include some of its findings in future
adaptation measures. Moreover, my goal is to continue to make political ecology relevant
within non-academic organizations, such as environmental NGOs. Walker (2006) points
out that another of political ecology’s weaknesses is that it tends to focus on critique
alone without providing solutions. As I have laid out in this dissertation, constructive
critique is necessary, and I have also provided examples of what I mean by integrated
adaptation and which policies and governance mechanisms require change. These
changes require the difficult exercise of understanding the social conditions that produce
and reproduce false narratives by providing useful and effective counter-narratives.
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APPENDIX A
DATA SOURCES

Table A1. List of persons interviewed.
ID Interviewee
Name
Type
5 Key Informant coded
22 Key Informant coded
coded
6 Respondent
coded
7 Respondent
coded
9 Respondent
coded
10 Respondent
coded
11 Respondent
coded
12 Respondent
coded
27 Respondent
coded
28 Respondent
coded
29 Respondent
coded
30 Respondent
24 Key Informant coded
25 Key Informant coded
26 Key Informant coded
16 Key Informant Alex Feller
17 Key Informant coded
18 Key Informant coded
19 Key Informant coded
20 Key Informant coded
21 Key Informant coded
50 Key Informant coded
Coded
1 Respondent
Coded
2 Respondent
Coded
3 Respondent
Coded
4 Respondent
Coded
8 Respondent

Relationship
GOS
GOS
GOS – ICZM
GOS – ICZM
GOS – ICZM
GOS – ICZM
GOS – ICZM
GOS – ICZM
GOS – ICZM
GOS – ICZM
GOS – ICZM
GOS – ICZM
Sluisegate Manager
Sluisegate Manager
Sluisegate Manager
Totness
Totness
Totness
Totness
Totness
Totness
Totness
WNZ
WNZ
WNZ
WNZ
WNZ
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Table A1 (continued). List of persons interviewed
Coded
WNZ
14 Respondent
Coded
WNZ
15 Respondent
Coded
WNZ
37 Respondent
coded
WNZ
38 Respondent
coded
WNZ
39 Respondent
coded
WNZ
40 Respondent
coded
WNZ
41 Respondent
coded
WNZ
42 Respondent
coded
WNZ
43 Respondent
coded
WNZ
44 Respondent
coded
WNZ
45 Respondent
coded
WNZ
46 Respondent
coded
WNZ
47 Respondent
coded
WNZ
48 Respondent
coded
WNZ
49 Respondent
WNZ
13 Key Informant Baynath
Development Consultant
32 Key Informant Maureen Silos
Ecologist
34 Key Informant Pieter Teunissen
Ecologist
35 Key Informant Dirk Noordam
Fisherman
23 Key Informant Roel Monsels
Historian
33 Key Informant Andre Loor
Hydrologist
36 Key Informant Siew Naipal
VIDS
31 Key Informant Hariette Vreedzaam
GOS = Government of Suriname; ICZM = Integrated Coastal Zone Management; WNZ
= Weg Naar Zee; VIDS = Organization of Indigenous Leaders in Suriname.
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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Semi-structured interview questions for government officials:
1. Can you describe the relationship between the IPPC and scientists/government
representatives in Suriname?
2. What has been the impact of the IPCC Working Group Reports on issues related
to climate change locally?
a. Funding
b. Publications
3. Can you describe any political and social reaction to the IPCC documents?
a. Speeches by politicians
b. Media reports
4. How would you describe the government’s attitude (political will) with respect to
the conclusions drawn by the IPCC?
5. As of November 2007, the first piece of environmental legislation was on hold to
be discussed in parliament. What has happened since?
a. How did this piece of legislation come about or, more specifically, what is
the history of environmental legislation in Suriname?
b. Is the issue of climate change and more specifically sea level rise and
coastal management addressed in this legislation?
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c. Why or why not?
6. Can you describe the government’s position regarding:
a. climate change
b. sea level rise
c. coastal management

Semi-structured interview questions for residents at Weg Naar Zee and Coronie:
1. What is the status of land tenure in your community?
a. How has tenure been achieved or denied?
2. Have there been any land use/cover changes since the community was
established?
3. What are the most common environmental/ecological concerns expressed by
community members?
a. Are any of these concerns regarding climate change?
b. Who is responsible for addressing these concerns?
c. Households, community or government?
4. Are there any specific historical instances when the community either
collaborated with or opposed the state in addressing an environmental crisis?
5. Given this historical relationship, what are the expectations of the state in
addressing future environmental crises?
6. Are you aware of any coastal management plans by the government?
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APPENDIX C
PERMISSIONS FOR REPRODUCTION OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

Figure C1a. Request for permission from De Ware Tijd by personal email.

Figure C1b. Received permission from De Ware Tijd by personal email.
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Figure C2a. Request for permission from Dagblad Suriname by personal email.

Figure C2b. Received permission from Dagblad Suriname by personal email.
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